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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

WAYNE HOFFMAN, an individual;
FREDERIC S. BIRNBAUM, an individual;
BRUCE C. BOYLES, an individual; G&G
VENTURES, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company; ANDREA LANNING, an
individual, and BOB TIKKER, an individual,

Supreme Court Case No. 47590

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
CLINT SIEGNER, BLUE VALLEY TENANT
ASSOCIATION, CHRISTINE BROWN,
RICK BROWN, HEATHER CAMPBELLADAMS, KATHLEEN GREENE, GARY
HARDY, BONITA HARDEY, CHARLENE
LANDIN, JUAN LANDIN, and JOYCE
MAGNUSON,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CITY OF BOISE, IDAHO, a municipal
corporation and a political subdivision of the
State of Idaho,
Defendant-Respondent.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.

HONORABLE LYNN G. NORTON

JOHN L. RUNFT

SCOTT B. MUIR

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO
000001

ADA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CV01-19-01127
Wayne Hoffman, Fred Birnbaum, Andrea Lanning, Bob
Tikker, Bruce Boyles, G&G Ventures, LLC, Clint Siegner,
Blue Valley Tenant Association, Christine Brown, Rick
Brown, Heather Campbell-adams, Kathleen Greene, Gary
Hardey, Bonita Hardey, Charlene Landin, Juan Landin,
Joyce Magnuson
╘╘╘╘Plaintiff,
vs.
City of Boise, Idaho
Defendant.
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Location:
Judicial Officer:
Filed on:
Appellate Case Number:

Ada County District Court
Norton, Lynn G.
01/17/2019
47590-2019

CASE INFORMATION
Case Type:

AA- All Initial District Court
Filings (Not E, F, and H1)

Case 11/26/2019 Appealed Case Status: Supreme Court Appeal
Case Flags: Clerk Alert
DATE

CASE ASSIGNMENT
Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
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CV01-19-01127
Ada County District Court
01/17/2019
Norton, Lynn G.

PARTY INFORMATION
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Lead Attorneys
Runft, John L.
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208-333-8506(W)
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Hoffman, Wayne

Runft, John L.
Retained
208-333-8506(W)
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Landin, Juan V
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And Filed
03/11/2019
03/11/2019

03/15/2019

04/12/2019
04/12/2019

04/15/2019

04/16/2019
04/19/2019

05/10/2019
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05/22/2019
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Civil Case Information Sheet
Summons
City of Boise, Idaho
Served: 03/14/2019
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•

Affidavit of Service
3/14/2019
Motion to Dismiss

Memorandum In Support of Motion
of Motion to Dismiss
Notice of Hearing
on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (5/22/19 at 330pm)
Acceptance of Service

Acceptance of Service
Second Revised Acceptance of Service
Response
Response to Motion to Dismiss
Reply
Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss - City of Boise

Motion to Dismiss (3:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Norton, Lynn G.)
Court Minutes (Judicial Officer: Norton, Lynn G. )

•

Memorandum
Decision and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and Striking Second Amended Complaint
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Final Judgment, Order Or Decree Entered
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Dismissed (Judicial Officer: Norton, Lynn G.)

07/12/2019

Civil Disposition Entered

07/26/2019

07/26/2019

07/26/2019

•
•
•

Declaration
Declaration of Scott B. Muir in Support of Memorandum of Attorney Fees
Memorandum of Costs & Attorney Fees
Defendant City of Boise's Memorandum of Attorney Fees
Motion
to Amend and Alter Judgment

07/26/2019
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Order
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Plaintiff Hoffman, Wayne
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of ╘2/11/2020
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Electronically Filed
1/17/2019 8:34 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Lusina Heiskari, Deputy Clerk

JOHN L. RUNFT (ISB # 1059)
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 333-8506
Fax: (208) 343-3246
Email: JRunft@runftsteele.com

Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

WAYNE HOFFMAN, an individual; FRED
BIRNBAUM, an individual; G&G
VENTURES, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company; BRUCE C. BOYLES, an
individual; ANDREA LANNING, an
individual; BOB TIKKER, an individual,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV01-19-01127
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Schedule: AA
Fee: $221.00

vs.
THE CITY OF BOISE, IDAHO; a municipal
corporation and a political sub-division of the
State of Idaho.
Defendant.

COMES NOW the above named Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney ofrecord, John L.
Runft of the firm of Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC, and for causes of actions against Defendant
complains and alleges as follows:

COMPLAINT, Page I
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PARTIES AND INTRODUCTION
1.

Plaintiff Wayne Hoffman (“Hoffman”) was at all times material to this Complaint,
and is, a registered voter, a resident of and a real property owner in, and pays ad
valorem taxes to, Ada County, State of Idaho.

2.

Plaintiff Fred Birnbaum (“Birnbaum”) was at all times material to this Complaint,
and is, a registered voter, a resident of and a real property owner in the City of Boise,
Idaho, and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County Idaho.

3.

Plaintiff G&G Ventures, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, (“G&G”), was at
all times material to this Complaint, and is, a resident of and a real property owner in
the City of Boise, and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County, State of Idaho.

4.

Plaintiff Bruce C. Boyles (“Boyles”) was at all times material to this Complaint, and
is, a registered voter, a resident of and a real property owner in the City of Boise,
Idaho, and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County Idaho.

5.

Plaintiff Andrea Lanning (“Lanning”) was at all times material to this Complaint, and
is, a registered voter, a resident of and a real property owner in the City of Boise,
Idaho, and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County Idaho.

6.

Plaintiff Bob Tikker (“Tikker”) was at all times material to this Complaint, and is, a
registered voter, a resident of and a real property owner in the City of Boise, Idaho,
and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County Idaho.

7.

Defendant City of Boise (“City”) is a municipal corporation, a body corporate and
politic, and a political sub-division of the State of Idaho, located in Ada County,
Idaho (Idaho Code §50-301).

COMPLAINT, Page 2
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE
8.

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Idaho Code §50-2027; §502911; 7- §5-514; Rule 84 IRCP.

9.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404.

ALLEGATIONS OF FACT AND LAW
10.

On November 28, 2018, the City passed Ordinance No. 55-18 (“Ord. 55-18”)
approving the Shoreline District Urban Renewal Plan (“Shoreline Plan”) that was
developed by and presented to the City for approval by the urban renewal agency of
the City of Boise, now known as the Capital City Development Corporation,
(“CCDC”).

11.

Ord. 55-18 adopted and provided for “revenue allocation financing” also known as
“tax increment financing” (“TIF”) of the Shoreline Plan pursuant to I.C. §50-2906.

12.

By its terms, Ord. 55-18 was made effective upon its publication in the Idaho
Statesman on December 20, 2018.

13.

On December 6, 2018, the City passed Ordinance No. 58-18 (“Ord. 58-81”)
approving the Gateway East District Urban Renewal Plan (“Gateway Plan”) that was
developed by and presented to the City for approval by the CCDC.

14.

Ord. 58-18 adopted and provided for “revenue allocation financing” also known as
“tax increment financing” (”TIF”) of the Gateway Plan pursuant to I.C. §50-2906.

COMPLAINT, Page 3
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15.

By its terms, Ord. 58-18 was made effect upon its publication in the Idaho Statesman
on December 20, 2018.

16.

In promulgating Ord. 55-18, the City committed to providing TIF financing to the
CCDC’s estimated “Project Costs” in the sum of $66,500,000.00 for the 20 year
duration of the Shoreline Plan, commencing retroactively from January 1, 2018,
through December 31, 2038. Said financing substantially exceeded the City’s annual
income and revenue.

17.

In promulgating Ord. 58-18, the City committed to providing TIF financing to the
CCDC’s estimated “Project Costs” in the sum of $96,500,000.00 for the 20 year
duration of the Gateway Plan, commencing retroactively from January 1, 2018,
through December 31, 2038. Said financing substantially exceeded the City’s annual
income and revenue.

18.

Both Ord. 55-18 and Ord. 58-18 (the “Ordinances”) were passed without the assent
of two-thirds (2/3) of the qualified electors thereof voting at an election to be held for
that purpose as required under Article VIII §3 of the Idaho Constitution for cities and
other subdivisions of the State whenever they incur any indebtedness or liability,
other than for ordinary and necessary expenses, in excess of their income and revenue
for the year.

19.

In promulgating the Ordinances, the City failed to find or to establish that the subject
revenue allocation financing (TIF financing) for the Shoreline Plan or the Gateway
Plan would be used to fund “ordinary and necessary” expenses of the City as
provided and required under Article VIII §3 of the Idaho Constitution.

COMPLAINT, Page 4
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20.

None of the exceptions set forth in Article VIII §3 of the Idaho Constitution to the
requirement that the assent of two-thirds (2/3) of the qualified electors be obtained in
the event there is no finding that the revenue allocation funding would be used to
fund “ordinary and necessary” expenses of the City are applicable with respect to the
promulgation of the Ordinances.

21.

As required by Idaho Code §50-2908, the TIF revenues allocated to the CCDC
pursuant to the Ordinances are calculated and paid directly to the CCDC by the
County Treasurer of Ada County, Idaho.

22.

The commitment by the City to allocate the TIF to the CCDC for 20 years pursuant to
the Ordinances violates Article VIII, §3 of the Idaho Constitution and creates by and
through said commitment a liability on the part of the City to the CCDC in violation
of the express prohibition contained in Article VIII, §3, to wit:
No county, city, board of education, or school district, or other
subdivision of the state, shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in
any manner, or for any purpose, exceeding in that year, the income
and revenue provided for it for such year….
COUNT I

23.

Plaintiffs reassert and re-allege the preceding paragraphs and incorporate them herein
by reference as though fully set forth herein.

24.

As applied to the City’s promulgation of the Ordinances and the City’s related
conduct in the premises, the Local Economic Development Act I.C. 50-2901, et seq.
violates the provisions Article VIII §3 of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting a city or
any sub-division of the state municipality from incurring, outside of “ordinary and

COMPLAINT, Page 5
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necessary expenses,” an indebtedness or liability exceeding income and revenue for a
specific year without the assent of qualified electors.

ATTORNEY’S FEES
25.

As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned conduct of Defendants,
Plaintiffs have been required to hire legal counsel and incur the costs and attorney’s
fees of this suit and is entitled to an award of same pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54, Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121.

WHEREFORE Plaintiffs pray that the Court enter judgment against Defendant, the City of
Boise, as follows:
1.

An order entering an injunction prohibiting the City from proceeding under
the Ordinances.

2.

A judgment declaring the revenue allocation provisions (TIF) set forth
under I. C. § 50-2901 et seq. (the Local Economic Development Act) as
applied to the City and the Ordinances to be violation of Article VIII, §3.

3.

For reasonable costs of suit, including attorney’s fees pursuant to Idaho Code
§§ 12-120 and 12-121;

4.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

COMPLAINT, Page 6
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DATED this I th day of January 20 l 9.

RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
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Electronically Filed
3/11/2019 4:55 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Lori Ferguson, Deputy Clerk

JOHN L. RUNFT (ISB # 1059)
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Phone: (208) 333-8506
Fax: (208) 343-3246
Email: JRunft@runftsteele.com

Attorney for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

WAYNE HOFFMAN, an individual;
FREDERIC S. BIRNBAUM, an individual;
BRUCE C. BOYLES, an individual; G&G
VENTURES, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company;
ANDREA LANNING,
an
individual; CLINT SIEGNER, an individual;
BOB TIKKER, an individual; BLUE
VALLEY TENANT ASSOCIATION, an
unincorporated
nonprofit
association;
CHRISTINE BROWN, an individual; RICK
BROWN, an individual; HEATHER DAWN
CAMPBELL-ADAMS,
an
individual;
KATHLEEN ANN GREENE, an individual;
BONITA L. HARDEY, an individual; GARY
HARDEY, an individual; CHARLENE
LANDIN, an individual; JUAN V. LANDIN,
an individual; JOYCE L. MAGNUSON, an
individual.

Case No. CV0l-19-01127
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF

Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE CITY OF BOISE, IDAHO; a municipal
corporation and a political sub-division of the
State ofldaho.
Defendant.
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COMES NOW the above named Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record, John L.
Runft of the firm of Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC, and for causes of actions against Defendant
complains and alleges as follows:

PARTIES AND INTRODUCTION
1.

Plaintiff Wayne Hoffman (“Hoffman”) was at all times material to this Complaint, and is, a
registered voter, an elector of the City of Boise, a resident of and a real property owner in,
and pays ad valorem taxes to, Ada County, State of Idaho.

2.

Plaintiff Fred S. Birnbaum (“Birnbaum”) was at all times material to this Complaint, and is, a
registered voter, an elector of the City of Boise, a resident of and a real property owner in the
City of Boise, Idaho, and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County Idaho.

3.

Plaintiff Bruce C. Boyles (“Boyles”) was at all times material to this Complaint, and is, a
registered voter, an elector of the City of Boise, a resident of and a real property owner in the
City of Boise, Idaho, and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County Idaho.

4.

Mike Gleason (“Gleason”) was at all times material to this Complaint, and is, a resident of
Eagle, Ada County, Idaho, and the owner of G&G Ventures, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company, (“G&G”), which owns real property in in the City of Boise, for which property
Gleason pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County, State of Idaho.

AMENDED COMPLAINT, Page 2
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5.

Plaintiff Andrea Lanning (“Lanning”) was at all times material to this Complaint, and is, a
registered voter, an elector of the City of Boise, a resident of and a real property owner in the
City of Boise, Idaho, and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County Idaho.

6.

Plaintiff Clint Siegner (“Siegner”) was at all times material to this Complaint, and is, a
registered voter, an elector of the City of Boise, a resident of and a real property owner in the
City of Boise, Idaho, and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County Idaho.

7.

Plaintiff Bob Tikker (“Tikker”) was at all times material to this Complaint, and is, a
registered voter, an elector of the City of Boise, a resident of and a real property owner in the
City of Boise, Idaho, and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County Idaho.

8.

Plaintiff Blue Valley Tenant Association (“Blue Valley”) is an Idaho unincorporated nonprofit association, filed on August 9, 2018, which represents the interests of its members in
striving to ensure that laws and regulations promulgated by local and state government in
Idaho are interpreted, applied, and enforced as intended by the United States Constitution and
the Idaho Constitution. The members of Blue Valley are all residents of the Blue Valley
Manufactured Home Community in the City of Boise in the current East Gateway Urban
Renewal District, all of whom pay ad valorem taxes to Ada County, Idaho. At all times
material to this Complaint, Bonita L. Hardy is a member and is the president of Blue Valley,
a registered voter, an elector of the City of Boise, a resident of and a real property owner in
the City of Boise, Idaho, and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County Idaho.

9.

Plaintiff Christine Brown (“C. Brown”) was at all times material to this Complaint, and is, a
registered voter, an elector of the City of Boise, a resident of and a real property owner in the
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City of Boise, Idaho, and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County Idaho.
10.

Plaintiff Rick Brown (“R. Brown”) was at all times material to this Complaint, and is, a
registered voter, an elector of the City of Boise, a resident of and a real property owner in the
City of Boise, Idaho, and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County Idaho.

11.

Plaintiff Heather Dawn Campbell-Adams (“Campbell-Adams”) was at all times material to
this Complaint, and is, a registered voter, an elector of the City of Boise, a resident of and a
real property owner in the City of Boise, Idaho, and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County
Idaho.

12.

Plaintiff Kathleen Ann Greene (“Greene”) was at all times material to this Complaint, and is,
a registered voter, an elector of the City of Boise, a resident of and a real property owner in
the City of Boise, Idaho, and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County Idaho.

13.

Plaintiff Bonita L. Hardey (“B. Hardey”) was at all times material to this Complaint, and is, a
registered voter, an elector of the City of Boise, a resident of and a real property owner in the
City of Boise, Idaho, and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County Idaho.

14.

Plaintiff Gary Hardey (“G. Hardey”) was at all times material to this Complaint, and is, a
registered voter, an elector of the City of Boise, a resident of and a real property owner in the
City of Boise, Idaho, and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County Idaho.

15.

Plaintiff Charlene Landin (“C. Landin”) was at all times material to this Complaint, and is, a
registered voter, an elector of the City of Boise, a resident of and a real property owner in the
City of Boise, Idaho, and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County Idaho.
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16.

Plaintiff Juan V. Landin (“J. Landin”) was at all times material to this Complaint, and is, a
registered voter, an elector of the City of Boise, a resident of and a real property owner in the
City of Boise, Idaho, and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County Idaho.

17.

Plaintiff Joyce L. Magnuson (“Magnuson”) was at all times material to this Complaint, and
is, a registered voter, an elector of the City of Boise, a resident of and a real property owner
in the City of Boise, Idaho, and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County Idaho.

18.

Defendant City of Boise (“City”) is a municipal corporation, a body corporate and politic,
and a political sub-division of the State of Idaho, located in Ada County, Idaho (Idaho Code
§50-301).

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
19.

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Idaho Code § 50-2027; §5 0-2911; 71305; § 5-514; Rule 84 IRCP.

20.

Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404.

ALLEGATIONS OF FACT AND LAW
21.

On December 18, 2018, the City passed Ordinance No. 55-18 (“Ord. 55-18”) approving the
Shoreline District Urban Renewal Plan (“Shoreline Plan”) that was developed by and
presented to the City for approval by the urban renewal agency of the City of Boise, now
known as the Capital City Development Corporation, (“CCDC”).

AMENDED COMPLAINT, Page 5
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22.

Ord. 55-18 adopted and provided for “revenue allocation financing” also known as “tax
increment financing” (“TIF”) of the Shoreline Plan pursuant to I.C. §50-2906.

23.

By its terms, Ord. 55-18 was made effective upon its publication in the Idaho Statesman on
December 20, 2018.

24.

On December 18, 2018, the City passed Ordinance No. 58-18 (“Ord. 58-81”) approving the
Gateway East District Urban Renewal Plan (“Gateway Plan”) that was developed by and
presented to the City for approval by the CCDC.

25.

Ord. 58-18 adopted and provided for “revenue allocation financing” also known as “tax
increment financing” (”TIF”) of the Gateway Plan pursuant to I.C. §50-2906.

26.

By its terms, Ord. 58-18 was made effect upon its publication in the Idaho Statesman on
December 20, 2018.

27.

In promulgating Ord. 55-18, the City committed to providing TIF financing to the CCDC’s
estimated “Project Costs” in the sum of $66,500,000.00 for the 20 year duration of the
Shoreline Plan, commencing retroactively from January 1, 2018, through December 31,
2038. Said financing substantially exceeded the City’s annual income and revenue.

28.

In promulgating Ord. 58-18, the City committed to providing TIF financing to the CCDC’s
estimated “Project Costs” in the sum of $96,500,000.00 for the 20 year duration of the
Gateway Plan, commencing retroactively from January 1, 2018, through December 31, 2038.
Said financing substantially exceeded the City’s annual income and revenue.
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29. Both Ord. 55-18 and Ord. 58-18 (the “Ordinances”) were passed without the assent of twothirds (2/3) of the qualified electors thereof voting at an election to be held for that purpose
as required under Article VIII §3 of the Idaho Constitution for cities and other subdivisions
of the State whenever they incur any indebtedness or liability, other than for ordinary and
necessary expenses, in excess of their income and revenue for the year.
30. In promulgating the Ordinances, the City failed to find or to establish that the subject revenue
allocation financing (TIF financing) for the Shoreline Plan or the Gateway Plan would be
used to fund “ordinary and necessary” expenses of the City as provided and required under
Article VIII §3 of the Idaho Constitution.
31. None of the exceptions set forth in Article VIII §3 of the Idaho Constitution to the
requirement that the assent of two-thirds (2/3) of the qualified electors be obtained in the
event there is no finding that the revenue allocation funding would be used to fund “ordinary
and necessary” expenses of the City are applicable with respect to the promulgation of the
Ordinances.
32. As required by Idaho Code §50-2908, the TIF revenues allocated to the CCDC pursuant to
the Ordinances are calculated and paid directly to the CCDC by the County Treasurer of Ada
County, Idaho.
33. The commitment by the City to allocate the TIF to the CCDC for 20 years pursuant to the
Ordinances violates Article VIII, §3 of the Idaho Constitution and creates by and through said
commitment a liability on the part of the City to the CCDC in violation of the express
prohibition contained in Article VIII, §3, to wit:
AMENDED COMPLAINT, Page 7
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No county, city, board of education, or school district, or other subdivision
of the state, shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in any manner, or for
any purpose, exceeding in that year, the income and revenue provided for it
for such year….

34.

Each and all of the aforenamed Plaintiffs oppose the use of the proceeds of their ad valorem
Taxes, or any other tax monies, to pay for or to support, directly or indirectly, long-term
urban renewal projects, such as specifically the Shoreline Plan and the Gateway Plan, without
an affirmative vote by two thirds of the qualified electors approving said project.

COUNT I
35.

Plaintiffs reassert and re-allege the preceding paragraphs and incorporate them herein by
reference as though fully set forth herein.

36.

As applied to the City’s promulgation of the Ordinances and the City’s related conduct in the
premises, the Local Economic Development Act I.C. 50-2901, et seq. violates the provisions
Article VIII §3 of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting a city or any sub-division of the state
municipality from incurring, outside of “ordinary and necessary expenses,” an indebtedness
or liability exceeding income and revenue for a specific year without the assent of qualified
electors.

ATTORNEY’S FEES
37.

As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned conduct of Defendants, Plaintiffs
have been required to hire legal counsel and incur the costs and attorney’s fees of this suit
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and is entitled to an award of same pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, Idaho Code
§§ 12-120 and 12-121.

WHEREFORE Plaintiffs pray that the Court enter judgment against Defendant, the City of
Boise, as follows:
1.

An order entering an injunction prohibiting the City from proceeding under
the Ordinances.

2.

A judgment declaring the revenue allocation provisions (TIF) set forth under
I. C. § 50-2901 et seq. (the Local Economic Development Act) as applied to
the City and the Ordinances to be violation of Article VIII, §3.

3.

For reasonable costs of suit, including attorney’s fees pursuant to Idaho Code
§§ 12-120 and 12-121;

4.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

DATED this 11th day of March 2019.
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

/S/ John L. Runft___________
JOHN L. RUNFT
Attorney for Plaintiff

AMENDED COMPLAINT, Page 9

000022

Electronically Filed
4/12/2019 2:38 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Amy King, Deputy Clerk

JAYME B. SULLIVAN
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY
SCOTT B. MUIR
Deputy City Attorney
KEVIN S. BORGER
Deputy City Attorney
CITY OF BOISE
OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY
P.O. Box 500
Boise, ID 83701-0500
Telephone: (208) 608-7950
Idaho State Bar No. 4229 and 3550
E-mail: BoiseCityAttorney@cityofboise.org
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
WAYNE HOFFMAN, an individual; FREDERIC
S. BIRNBAUM, an individual; BRUCE C.
BOYLES, an individual; G&G VENTURES, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company; ANDREA
LANNING, an individual; CLINT SIEGNER, an
individual; BOB TIKKER, an individual; BLUE
VALLEY TENANT ASSOCIATION, an
unincorporated nonprofit association; CHRISTINE
BROWN, an individual; RICK BROWN, an
individual; HEATHER DAWN CAMPBELLADAMS, an individual; KATHLEEN ANN
GREENE, an individual; BONITA L. HARDEY,
an individual; GARY HARDEY, an individual;
CHARLENE LANDIN, an individual; JUAN V.
LANDIN, an individual; JOYCE L. MAGNUSON,
an individual,

Case No. CV0l-19-01127

MOTION TO DISMISS
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 12(b)(1)
& (6)

Plaintiffs,
V.

THE CITY OF BOISE, IDAHO; a municipal
corporation and a political subdivision of the State
ofldaho,
Defendant.

MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO IRCP 12(b)(l) & (6) - 1

000023

COMES NOW Defendant, City of Boise and requests the Court dismiss this action for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
This motion is supported by a memorandum filed contemporaneously with this motion.
DATED this

12th

day of April 2019.
OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY
/s/ Scott B. Muir
SCOTT B. MUIR, Deputy City Attorney
Attorney for Defendant
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COMES NOW the Defendant, City of Boise, by and through its attorney of record, Scott
B. Muir, and submits its memorandum of fact and law in support of its Motion to Dismiss.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs have filed this lawsuit to challenge Ordinance No. 55-18 approving the Shoreline
District Urban Renewal Plan (“Shoreline Plan”) and Ordinance No. 58-18 approving the Gateway
East District Urban Renewal Plan (“Gateway Plan”). (Compl., ¶¶ 10 & 13, p. 3; ¶ 24, p. 5; Second
Am. Compl., ¶ 21, p. 5, ¶ 24, p. 6, ¶ 36, p. 9). Ordinance No. 55-18 and Ordinance No. 58-18 were
made effective upon publication in the Idaho Statesman on December 20, 2018. (Compl., ¶ 12, p.
3, ¶ 15, p. 4; Second Am. Comp., ¶¶ 23 & 26, p. 6).
The Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief was filed on January 17, 2019, by six
named plaintiffs: Wayne Hoffman, Fred Birnbaum, G&G Ventures, LLC, Bruce C. Boyles,
Andrea Lanning, and Bob Tikker. As to each plaintiff, it is alleged that they are a registered voter,
a resident of and a real property owner in the City of Boise, and pay ad valorem taxes to Ada
County, State of Idaho (Plaintiff Wayne Hoffman is not alleged to be a resident of and a real
property owner in the City of Boise, but only in Ada County. Plaintiff G&G Ventures, LLC is not
alleged to be a registered voter). (Compl., ¶¶ 1-6, p. 2).
On March 11, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief. Several plaintiffs were added to the lawsuit, and in particular, it is alleged that the members
of new Plaintiff Blue Valley Tenant Association “are all residents of the Blue Valley Manufactured
Home Community in the City of Boise in the Current East Gateway Urban Renewal District”.
(Am. Compl., ¶8, p. 3).
The City of Boise accepted service of the Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief on March 29, 2019.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO IRCP 12(b)(1)
& (6) - 2
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Idaho Code§ 50-2027(2) provides limitations on challenges to ordinances approving urban
renewal plans, as follows:
For a period of thirty (30) days after the effective date of the ordinance or
resolution, any person in interest shall have the right to contest the legality of such
ordinance, resolution or proceeding or any bonds which may be authorized thereby.
No contest or proceeding to question the validity or legality of any ordinance,
resolution or proceeding, or any bonds which may be authorized thereby, passed or
adopted under the provisions of this chapter shall be brought in any court by any
person for any cause whatsoever, after the expiration of thirty (30) days from the
effective date of the ordinance, resolution or proceeding, and after such time the
validity, legality and regularity of such ordinance, resolution or proceeding or any
bonds authorized thereby shall be conclusively presumed. If the question of the
validity of any adopted plan or bonds issued pursuant to this chapter is not raised
within thirty (30) days from the effective date of the ordinance, resolution or
proceeding issuing said bonds and fixing their terms, the authority of the plan, the
authority adopting the plan, or the authority to issue the bonds, and the legality
thereof, the same shall be conclusively presumed and no court shall thereafter have
authority to inquire into such matters.
ARGUMENT
PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING TO
CHALLENGE THE URBAN RENEWAL PLANS.
The Supreme Court of Idaho has addressed the specific issue of standing to challenge the
validity of an urban renewal plan. Thomson v. City ofLewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d488 (2002).
Plaintiffs must establish standing under a traditional standing analysis. Miles v. Idaho Power
Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989) set forth the three elements of standing:

1. "The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the
party wishes to have adjudicated."
2. "[T]o satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants generally must
allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that that judicial
relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury."
3. "[A] citizen and taxpayer may not challenge a governmental enactment where the
injury is one suffered alike by all citizens and taxpayers of the jurisdiction."
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Thompson at 477, quoting Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371, 375, 913
P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996) (quoting Miles, 116 Idaho at 641, 778 P.2d at 763). The third standing
proposition from Miles is controlling in the instant case, i.e., the injury alleged is one suffered alike
by all citizens and taxpayers of the jurisdiction.
In challenging an urban renewal plan, plaintiffs do not have standing simply on the basis
of being taxpayers of the jurisdiction. To have standing, plaintiffs must allege they have a
particularized injury resulting from the creation of the urban renewal district. Standing is not
established by alleging an injury that is “suffered alike by all citizens and taxpayers of the
jurisdiction.” Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 478, 50 P.3d 488, 492 (2002). Idaho
Code § 50-2027(2) does not confer standing on a plaintiff solely by virtue of being a taxpayer.
“[T]he legislature did not intend to broaden the traditional standing requirements by using the term
‘person of interest’ as a person who could bring an action” in enacting Idaho Code § 50-2027. Id.
at 478. “By using the term ‘any person in interest’ rather than ‘any person,’ we hold that the
legislature intended to limit the number of possible plaintiffs, and incorporate common law
standing principles. Therefore, Idaho Code § 50-2027 does not eliminate the need for a plaintiff
to satisfy traditional standing requirements. . .” Id. at 478.
None of the original six plaintiffs named in the initial Complaint allege a particularized
injury resulting from the creation of the urban renewal district or that they are residents or own
property in the urban renewal district, and therefore, they lack standing.
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Idaho Code§ 50-2017(2) established a 30-day period in which to challenge the legality of
an urban renewal plan ordinance, but as stated, none of the original six plaintiffs have standing to
do so. Plaintiffs attempt to circumvent the 30-day period (ending January 19, 2019), by filing a
Complaint on January 17, 2019, and then adding plaintiffs who arguably have standing in an
amended complaint filed on March 11, 2019. There is no provision of Idaho law which allows a
Complaint to be filed as a "placeholder" to be amended at a later date to add plaintiffs with
standing. Plaintiff Blue Valley Tenant Association alleges that it is made up of "residents of the
Blue Valley Manufactured Home Community in the City of Boise in the Current East Gateway
Urban Renewal District". (Am. Compl., ,r 8, p. 3). They did not join the lawsuit until the filing of
the Amended Complaint on March 11, 2019. The Amended Complaint does not relate back to the
January 17, 2019, date of the original Complaint, and therefore, the Blue Valley Tenant
Association has not timely filed within the 30 days provided by Idaho Code§ 50-2027(2).
Plaintiffs, who timely filed within the 30-day statutory period, lack standing to file this
action, and it should be dismissed with prejudice.

ATTORNEY'S FEES
This action was brought in disregard to established Idaho law on point from Thomson v.

City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002) (holding that Idaho Code § 50-2027 did not
eliminate the requirement that plaintiffs satisfy traditional standing requirements). Defendant City
of Boise is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees as the prevailing party in an action
brought without a reasonable basis in fact or law pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117. In the
alternative, Defendant City of Boise is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees pursuant
to Idaho Code§ 12-121 as this action was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO IRCP 12(b)(l)
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the above arguments, Defendant City of Boise respectfully requests this Court
dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint against Defendant City of Boise with prejudice and award the City
of Boise reasonable attorney's fees in defending this action.
DATED this

12th

day of April 2019.
OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY
/s/ Scott B. Muir
SCOTT B. MUIR, Deputy City Attorney
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have on this

12th

day of April 2019, I electronically filed the

foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the iCourt system which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing
to the following persons:
John L. Runft
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
1020 W. Main St., Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83 702
JRunft@runftsteele.com
/s/ Scott B. Muir
SCOTT B. MUIR
Deputy City Attorney
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COMES NOW the above named Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney ofrecord, John L.
Runft of the firm of Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC, and submits this Response to Defendant
City of Boise's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(l) & (6) (hereafter, City's

"Motion").

I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

The Plaintiffs herein concur with the factual allegations set forth in the Statement of Facts of

the City's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P 12(b)(l) & (6)
(hereafter, City's "Memo").

2.

Plaintiff Blue Valley Tenant Association (hereafter, "Blue Valley") is an Idaho

unincorporated non-profit association, which represents the interests of its members in striving to
ensure that laws and regulations promulgated by local and state government in Idaho are interpreted,
applied, and enforced as intended by the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution. The
members of Blue Valley are all residents of the Blue Valley Manufactured Home Community in the
City of Boise, in the current East Gateway Urban Renewal District, all of whom pay ad valorem
taxes to Ada County, Idaho. At all times material to the Complaint herein, Bonita L. Hardy is a
member and is the president of Blue Valley, a registered voter, an elector of the City of Boise, a
resident of and a real property owner in the City of Boise, Idaho, and pays ad valorem taxes to Ada
County Idaho.

3.

Defendant City of Boise ("City") is a municipal corporation, a body corporate and politic, and

a political sub-division of the State ofldaho, located in Ada County, Idaho (Idaho Code §50-301).
Response to Motion to Dismiss, Page 2 of 11
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4.

On December 20, 2018, Boise City Ordinance No. 55-18 (“Ord. 55-18”) and Ordinance No.

58-18 (“Ord. 58-18”) became final and provided for “revenue allocation financing,” also known as
“tax increment financing” (“TIF”), of the subject urban renewal Plans pursuant to I.C. §50-2906.
5.

Pursuant to said Ordinances, the City committed to provide the TIF financing to the urban

renewal agency (“CCDC”) for said urban renewal Plans for a period of twenty (20) years, thereby far
exceeding the City’s relevant annual income and revenue.
6.

As a result of the TIF financing, Ada County, the primary ad valorem Taxing District (I.C §

63-201(23)) in which the urban renewal areas designated by the Plans were located, was limited to
the assessing the valuation of real and personal property at the 2018 Base Assessment Roll for
twenty (20) years on said property in said urban renewal areas, thereby (a) reducing Ada County’s
funds available for essential services and (b) subjecting other property in Ada County outside of the
urban renewal area to the burden of increased ad valorem taxation for the entire county arising from
inflation, increased urbanization with its attendant infrastructure costs and services, and rising
property values.
7.

Both Ord. 55-18 and Ord. 58-18 (the “Ordinances”) were passed without the assent of two-

thirds (2/3) of the qualified electors thereof voting at an election to be held for that purpose as
required under Article VIII § 3 of the Idaho Constitution for cities and other subdivisions of the State
whenever they incur any indebtedness or liability (other than for ordinary and necessary expenses) in
excess of their income and revenue for the year.
8.

Each and all of the aforenamed Plaintiffs, have been at all times relevant herein, and are, ad

valorem tax payers in Ada County, and, as such, oppose above-referenced, alleged unconstitutional
Response to Motion to Dismiss, Page 3 of 11
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use of the proceeds of their ad valorem taxes to fund, pay for, or to support, directly or indirectly, the
subject urban renewal Plans, without an affirmative vote by two thirds of the qualified electors
approving each of said Plans.

II.

ARGUMENT

1. Plaintiffs, as Ada County tax payers, have standing to challenge the urban renewal

Plans on constitutional grounds under Article VIII § (3) of the Idaho Constitution.
The City contends that Plaintiffs, who are all taxpayers in Ada County, Idaho, in which the
subject urban renewal districts under the Plan are located, must establish standing under a traditional
standing analysis, citing the holdings of the court in Thomson v. City ofLewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50
P.3d 488 (2002) and Miles v. Idaho Power Co, 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989). To have
standing, the City argues that, " ... the Plaintiffs must allege that they have a particularized injury
resulting from the creation of the urban renewal district ... " and that Plaintiffs' claim that they have
suffered injury injury as taxpayers of Ada County is insufficient to challenge a government action,
where " ... the alleged injury is one suffered alike by all citizens and taxpayers of the jurisdiction."
(City's Memo, p.4)

It should be noted at the outset that the Plaintiff in Thomson did not allege a constitutional

violation. The Plaintiff in that case alleged that as "a resident and tax payer in the City of Lewiston,
Nez Perce County, Idaho, and a person of interest pursuant to the provisions of§ 50-2027 Idaho
Code ... " he had standing to challenge the validity of the city's ordinance " ... because the area
covered by the Plan does not meet the statutory definition of deteriorating condition for open land,
as defined by Idaho Code § 50-2008(d) and thus, the City lacked authority to adopt the Ordinance
Response to Motion to Dismiss, Page 4 of 11
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enacting the Plan.” Thomson, 50 P.3rd at 490. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the District Court’s
dismissal of Thomson for lack of standing for failure to establish standing under the traditional
standing analysis discussed at length by the Court.
However, in a case directly on point with the present case, the Idaho Supreme Court carved
out a new exception to the standard requirements for standing for taxpayers of a jurisdiction seeking
relief on constitutional grounds in Koch et al. v, Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 162-163, 177 P. 3d
372 (2008), a case which is subsequent to all authority cited by the City. In Koch, the Plaintiffs
claimed standing as residents of Canyon County and owners of real property in the county upon
which they pay real property taxes and contended that the lease agreement entered into by the County
violated Article VIII § 3 of the Idaho Constitution, which prohibits counties and other subdivisions
of the State from incurring any indebtedness or liability (other than for ordinary and necessary
expenses) in excess of their income and revenue for the year without voter approval.
The Court acknowledged and discussed the general rule governing standing for claims based
on status as a citizen or taxpayer of a jurisdiction, citing Troutner v. Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389,
391, 128 P.3d 926, 928 (2006); Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849,
852, 119 P.3d 624, 627 (2005); and also Miles v. Idaho Power Co., for the fact that the Idaho
Supreme Court has looked to decisions of the United States Supreme Court for guidance.
Accordingly, the Court in Koch pointed out that in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20
L.Ed.2d 947 (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court carved out a narrow exception against the general
prohibition against taxpayer standing, citing Hein, 551 U.S. at ____, 127 S.Ct. at 2564, 168 L.Ed.2d
at 439. In Flast, the Court held that a taxpayer did have standing to challenge a congressional
appropriation that violated a specific constitutional limitation upon the congressional taxing and
Response to Motion to Dismiss, Page 5 of 11
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spending power. Likewise, the Idaho Supreme Court has also recognized such a rule in Greer v.
Lewiston Golf & Country Club, Inc., 81 Idaho 393, 342 P.2d 719, (1959) (citations omitted), wherein
the Court stated: “Taxpayers have been held qualified to maintain an action to test the validity of a
statute or ordinance which increases the tax burden. Generally cases so holding involve an alleged
illegal expenditure of public money.” Greer at Idaho 397; P.2d 722. Accordingly, an exception to
the general rule has long been made with regard to Article VIII § 3 of the Idaho Constitution, as
stated by the Court in Koch:
For over one-hundred years this Court has entertained taxpayer or citizen
challenges based upon that constitutional provision (numerous cases cited).
Even though standing is jurisdictional and may be raised at any time,
including on appeal, Beach Lateral Water Users Ass'n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho
600, 130 P.3d 1138 (2006), this Court has never questioned the standing of a
taxpayer to challenge expenditures that allegedly violate Article VIII, § 3.
Koch, 145 Idaho at 162, 177 P.3d at 376

The strict construction of Article VIII § 3 originally set forth above by the Court in Feil v.
City of Coeur d’ Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 49-50, 129 P. 643, 648-49 (1912) has been continually
reasserted and upheld by the Idaho Supreme Court. As reiterated by the Court in Koch, the primary
purpose and objectives of Article VIII § 3 of the Idaho Constitution are as follows:
Article VIII § 3 was designed primarily to protect taxpayers and citizens of
political subdivisions. Feil v. City of Coeur d’ Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 49-50, 129
P. 643, 648-49 (1912). They are the ones who would bear the consequences
of the subdivision incurring excessive indebtedness. In order to do so, the
framers of our Constitution granted the qualified electors of the political
subdivision the constitutional right to vote upon whether the subdivision
could incur indebtedness or liabilities exceeding its income and revenue for
the year. It cannot do so “without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified
electors thereof voting at an election to be held for that purpose.”
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***
It is not sufficient to simply say that the issue should be left to the political
process. With some exceptions, Article VIII § 3 requires a two-thirds vote of
the qualified electors to approve an expenditure, while officials violating the
Constitution's spending restraints can retain their positions by a simple
majority vote. Thus, leaving the matter to the political process would, in
effect, change the required two-thirds vote to a simple majority.
Id. 145 Idaho at 162, 177 P.3d at 376

The Court in Koch further explained the rationale for carving out the exception to the general
rule on taxpayer standing claimed by the Plaintiff taxpayers of Ada County in the present case, as
follows:
If this Court were to hold that taxpayers do not have standing to challenge the
incurring of indebtedness or liability in violation of that specific
constitutional provision, we would, in essence, be deleting that provision
from the Constitution. The County acknowledged during oral argument that
nobody would have standing. Other than a political subdivision invoking the
provision when it does not want to pay for what it has received, e.g., McNutt
v. Lemhi County, 12 Idaho 63, 84 P. 1054 (1906), there would be nobody who
could require that political subdivisions comply with this constitutional
provision.
Id. 145 Idaho at 162, 177 P.3d at 376

Finally, the Court in Koch left no doubt that the constitutional prohibition against incurring
excessive debt or liability applies to the City’s allocating the incremental tax revenues to the CCDC.
In this respect the court stated: “There is no logical difference between making an appropriation that
is specifically prohibited by the Constitution and incurring an indebtedness or liability that is
specifically prohibited by the Constitution.” Id. 145 Idaho at 162-163, 177 P.3d 376-377.
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Based on the Court's decision in Koch, the Plaintiffs have standing as taxpayers of Ada
County, Idaho.

2. Plaintiffs that were ioined to this action after the thirty (30) day period under I.C. § 502017(2) should not be dismissed, since their interests as taxpayers of Ada County are
identical to the initial Plaintiffs and thus do not add any additional claims or causes of
action.
The claim of the City that the parties who joined in this action after the thirty (30) deadline
should be dismissed is misplaced since (a) the jurisdiction for this action was established by the
initial Plaintiffs who timely filed the initial Complaint on January 17, 2019; (b) the claims of the
subsequent joining parties as taxpayers of Ada County, Idaho, are identical to those of the initial
Plaintiffs thus do not add any additional claims or causes of action not contemplated by the initial
Plaintiffs in their complaint; and (c) that the said identical claims of the joining parties relate back
under IRCP Rule 15 to the facts, claims, and issues of the Complaint. In some respects, the joining
Plaintiffs resemble interveners in that their claims relate back and should be allowed to join pursuant
to the interplay of IRCP Rules 15 and 17.

I.R.C.P. 17(a) provides in relevant part:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An executor,
administrator, personal representative ... may sue in this capacity without joining the
party for whose benefit the action is brought. ... No action shall be dismissed on the
ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a
reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of
the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such
ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had
been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
I.R.C.P. 17(a).
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The court’s attention is directed to Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 33
P.3d 816, (2001), in which the Idaho Supreme Court found that the district court erred in denying a
motion to amend the complaint to the wrongful death claim for the reason that I.R.C.P. 15(c) and
17(a) provided the moving party with a means by which to substitute a real party in interest and then
relate the amendment back to the date of the original complaint. Consequently, the district court's
decision to deny the motion to amend was reversed and remanded. In the present case, the
conceptual analogy of adding a party or substituting a party is sound where the claims are identical
and there is no prejudice to the opposing party.
As pointed out in Hayward, various federal courts have also provided informative insight on
the combined application of Rule 15(c) and Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
For example, in Crowder v. Gordons Transports, Inc., 387 F.2d 413 (8th Cir.1967),
the circuit court reviewed a district court's dismissal of a wrongful death claim based
on a finding that the statute of limitations had run. Id. at 414. The wrongful death
claim had originally been filed by the decedent's wife who was named in the
complaint as "administratrix of the estate of the decedent, as plaintiff." Id. Under the
applicable state law, the administratrix was not an appropriate party to bring a
wrongful death action. Id. at 415. Consequently, the plaintiff moved to amend the
complaint in order to bring the action on behalf of the heirs of the decedent. Id. at
414. On appeal, the eighth circuit found that the district court erred in dismissing the
complaint, as rules 15(c) and 17(a) covered the relation-back issue presented to the
court. Id. at 418. In reaching its decision, the court looked to the policy behind the
federal rules such as eliminating "procedural booby traps" and permitting that "bona
fide complaints be carried to an adjudication on the merits." Id.

The Court’s attention is also directed to Beal for Martinez v. City of Seattle, 134 Wn.2d 769,
954 P.2d 237, (1998), in which the supreme court of Washington in reversing the court below
allowed post deadline joinder of a party was permitted by CR 15(c) and 17(a), where the claims were
identical and only change was a change in the representative capacity in which suit was brought, and
where there was no prejudice to the defendant. So it is in the present case; the claims are the same
Response to Motion to Dismiss, Page 9 of 11
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and the only change is the parties representing the claims. The legal policies involved in the
interworking ofIRCP Rules 15 and 17 strongly support a liberal view towards allowing parties their
day in court, especially when there is no prejudice to the opposing party. Being virtually at the outset
of this action, the addition of these parties and their identical claims do not serve to prejudice the
City. See Conda Partnership, Inc. v. MD. Const. Co., Inc., 115 Idaho 902, 771 P .2d 920, (App.
1989);

III.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above and based on the supporting authorities, the City's Motion in it is
entirety should be dismissed.

th

DATED this 10 day of May 2019.

RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By: __/_S/_J_o_h_n_R_u_n_ft_ _ _ _ _ _ __
JOHN L. RUNFT
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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I certify that on this 10 day of May, 2019, I filed the foregoing electronically through the iCourt
system, which caused the following parties or counsel to be served by electronic means, as more
fully reflected on the Notice of Electronic Filing:

Jayme B. Sullivan
Boise City Attorney

boisecityattorney@cityofboise.org

Scott B. Muir
Deputy City Attorney
Kevin S. Borger
Deputy City Attorney
City of Boise
Office of the City Attorney
PO Box 500
Boise, Idaho 83701

RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

/S/ John Runft
JOHN L. RUNFT
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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Plaintiffs,
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THE CITY OF BOISE, IDAHO; a municipal
corporation and a political subdivision of the State
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Defendant.
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COMES NOW the Defendant, City of Boise, by and through its attorney of record, Scott
B. Muir, and submits its Reply Brief in Support of the Motion to Dismiss.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs assert in their response to the City’s motion to dismiss that they have standing to
challenge the Shoreline District Urban Renewal Plan and the Gateway East District Urban
Renewal Plan by virtue of being Ada County taxpayers. They argue that their Complaint alleges
that as applied to the City’s Ordinances, the Local Economic Development Act, I.C. § 50-2901, et
seq. (the Act) violates the provisions of Article VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs cite to Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 177 P.3d 372 (2008) for support
that they have standing as taxpayers to challenge the urban renewal plans because the Complaint
alleges a violation of Article VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution. Koch is readily distinguishable
from the instant case. Koch was brought by Canyon County taxpayers alleging that a lease
agreement entered into by Canyon County violated the constitutional prohibition of the County to
incur any indebtedness or liability, other than for ordinary and necessary expenses, in excess of
their income and revenue for the year. Here, the Complaint does not allege, and there are no facts
that would support an allegation, that the City of Boise incurred any indebtedness or liability by
promlugating Ordinance No. 58-18 ("Gateway Plan") or Ordinance No. 55-18 ("Shoreline Plan").
It is the City’s urban renewal agency, Capitol City Development Corporation ("CCDC"),
and not the City, that uses revenue allocation financing under the Local Economic Development
Act to facilitate the urban renewal plan. Therefore, it is CCDC, and not the City of Boise, that
may incur indebtedness or liability. The City does not incur indebtedness or liability by approving
the Gateway Plan or the Shoreline Plan. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that it is the urban
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renewal agency that uses revenue allocation financing. "[U]rban renewal agencies are not the 'alter
egos' of cities. Therefore, the Act’s grant of authority to urban renewal agencies to issue revenue
allocation bonds does not violate Article VIII, §§ 3 or 4 of the Idaho Constitution." Urban Renewal
Agency of City of Rexburg v. Hart, 148 Idaho 299, 303, 222 P.3d 467, 471 (2009).
Therefore, standing is not conferred on plaintiffs solely by virtue of being a taxpayer, but
plaintiffs must allege they have a particularized injury resulting from the creation of the urban
renewal district.
CONCLUSION
Defendant City of Boise respectfully requests this Court find that plaintiffs lack standing
to bring this action and dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice and award the City of Boise.
DATED this 20th

day of May 2019.
OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY
/s/ Scott B. Muir
SCOTT B. MUIR, Deputy City Attorney
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the iCourt system which sent a Notice of Electronic Filing
to the following persons:
John L. Runft
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
1020 W. Main St., Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83702
JRunft@runftsteele.com
/s/ Scott B. Muir
SCOTT B. MUIR
Deputy City Attorney
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Filed: 07/12/2019 15:22:24
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Korsen, Janine
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

WAYNE HOFFMAN, FRED
BIRNBAUM, ANDREA LANNING, BOB
TIKKER, BRUCE BOYLES, G&G
VENTURES, LLC, CLINT SIEGNER,
BLUE VALLEY TENANT
ASSOCIATION, CHRISTINE BROWN,
RICK BROWN, HEATHER CAMPBELLADAMS, KATHLEEN GREENE, GARY
HARDEY, BONITA HARDEY,
CHARLENE LANDIN, JUAN LANDIN,
JOYCE MAGNUSON,

Case No. CV01-19-01127
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AND
STRIKING SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CITY OF BOISE, IDAHO,
Defendant.

The Defendant City of Boise, Idaho, filed a Motion to Dismiss which came before the Court
for hearing on May 22, 2019.
Appearances:

John Runft and John Steele for Plaintiffs
Scott Muir and Kevin Borger for Defendant

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Wayne Hoffman, Fred Birnbaum, Bruce Boyles, G&G Ventures, LLC,
Andrea Lanning, and Bob Tikker filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
on January 17, 2019. The Complaint challenges two ordinances passed by Boise City
pursuant to I.C. §50-2906: Ordinance No. 55-18 approved the Shoreline District Urban
Renewal Plan ("Shoreline Plan") and was passed on November 28, 2018, and
Ordinance No. 58-18 approved the Gateway East District Urban Renewal Plan
("Gateway Plan").

Both ordinances provide for "revenue allocation financing", also

known as "tax increment financing" ("TIF"), for the plans. Each ordinance was made
effective by its terms upon its publication in the Idaho Statesman on December 20,
2018. The Complaint alleges this Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
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Idaho Code §§ 50-2027, 50-2911, and 7-5-514; and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
("I.R.C.P.") 84. The statute of limitations in Idaho Code § 50-2027 expired two days
after the Complaint was filed.
On March 11, 2019, an Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
was filed. The Plaintiffs did not file a motion for leave to amend since the City of Boise
had not answered. The Amended Complaint added Plaintiffs including Clint Siegner,
Blue Valley Tenant Association, Christine Brown, Rick Brown, Heather CampbellAdams, Kathleen Greene, Gary Hardey, Bonita Hardey, Charlene Landin, Juan Landin,
and Joyce Magnuson.
On March 28, 2019, a Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief was filed.
The Defendant City of Boise, Idaho, filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and (6), with a memorandum in support, 1 on April 12, 2019. On May
10, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a Response to Motion to Dismiss. 2 The City of Boise filed a
reply on May 20, 2019. 3
The Court has considered all materials filed in support of and opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss.
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

The Court identifies there is a procedural error with regard to the complaints filed.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15 states:
(1) A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of right within:
(A) 21 days after serving it, or
(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21
days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a
motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.
(2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading
only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave.
The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and (6) ("Def's
Memo"), filed Apr. 12, 2019.
2
The Court notes the response is titled "Defendant's Response to Motion to Dismiss" although it
was actually filed by the Plaintiffs: Defendants' Response to Motion to Dismiss ("Pis' Response"), filed
May 10, 2019.
3
Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and (6) ("Reply"), filed
May 20, 2019.
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I.R.C.P. 15 (emphasis added).
An Amended Complaint was filed on March 11, 2019, before an Answer or
motion to dismiss was filed. This was the amendment as a matter of right. A Second
Amended Complaint was filed on April 1, 2019, which was also before an answer or
motion to dismiss was filed.

However, the Plaintiffs did not move the Court for

permission to amend the complaint a second time and there is no evidence before the
Court that Plaintiffs obtained written consent from Boise City to file this Second
Amended Complaint.

Therefore, the Court finds the Plaintiffs' Second Amended

Complaint was filed in violation of the civil rules and is not a proper pleading which can
be considered. Thus, the Court STRIKES the Second Amended Complaint from the
record and notifies the Plaintiffs that any additional parties, claims, or facts included
therein, which are not a part of the Amended Complaint, are not part of the record in this
case and will not be addressed herein.
LEGAL STANDARDS

Idaho Code § 50-2027(2) provides:
For a period of thirty (30) days after the effective date of the ordinance
or resolution, any person in interest shall have the right to contest the
legality of such ordinance, resolution or proceeding or any bonds which
may be authorized thereby. No contest or proceeding to question the
validity or legality of any ordinance, resolution or proceeding, or any
bonds which may be authorized thereby, passed or adopted under the
provisions of this chapter shall be brought in any court by any person
for any cause whatsoever, after the expiration of thirty (30) days from
the effective date of the ordinance, resolution or proceeding, and after
such time the validity, legality and regularity of such ordinance,
resolution or proceeding or any bonds authorized thereby shall be
conclusively presumed. If the question of the validity of any adopted
plan or bonds issued pursuant to this chapter is not raised within thirty
(30) days from the effective date of the ordinance, resolution or
proceeding issuing said bonds and fixing their terms, the authority of
the plan, the authority adopting the plan, or the authority to issue the
bonds, and the legality thereof, the same shall be conclusively
presumed and no court shall thereafter have authority to inquire into
such matters.
Section 3 of Article VI 11 of the Idaho Constitution provides limitations on county
and municipal indebtedness and states, in relevant part:
No county, city, board of education, or school district, or other
subdivision of the state, shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in any
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manner, or for any purpose, exceeding in that year, the income and
revenue provided for it for such year, without the assent of two-thirds of
the qualified electors thereof voting at an election to be held for that
purpose, nor unless, before or at the time of incurring such
indebtedness, provisions shall be made for the collection of an annual
tax sufficient to pay the interest on such indebtedness as it falls due,
and also to constitute a sinking fund for the payment of the principal
thereof, within thirty years from the time of contracting the same. Any
indebtedness or liability incurred contrary to this provision shall be void:
Provided, that this section shall not be construed to apply to the
ordinary and necessary expenses authorized by the general laws of the
state and provided further that any city may own, purchase, construct,
extend, or equip, within and without the corporate limits of such city, off
street parking facilities, public recreation facilities, and air navigation
facilities, and for the purpose of paying the cost thereof may, without
regard to any limitation herein imposed, with the assent of two-thirds of
the qualified electors voting at an election to be held for that purpose,
issue revenue bonds therefor, the principal and interest of which to be
paid solely from revenue derived from rates and charges for the use of,
and the service rendered by, such facilities as may be prescribed by
law, and provided further, that any city or other political subdivision of
the state may own, purchase, construct, extend, or equip, within and
without the corporate limits of such city or political subdivision, water
systems, sewage collection systems, water treatment plants, sewage
treatment plants, and may rehabilitate existing electrical generating
facilities, and for the purpose of paying the cost thereof, may, without
regard to any limitation herein imposed, with the assent of a majority of
the qualified electors voting at an election to be held for that purpose,
issue revenue bonds therefor, the principal and interest of which to be
paid solely from revenue derived from rates and charges for the use of,
and the service rendered by such systems, plants and facilities, as may
be prescribed by law; and provided further that any port district, for the
purpose of carrying into effect all or any of the powers now or hereafter
granted to port districts by the laws of th is state, may contract
indebtedness and issue revenue bonds evidencing such indebtedness,
without the necessity of the voters of the port district authorizing the
same, such revenue bonds to be payable solely from all or such part of
the revenues of the port district derived from any source whatsoever
excepting only those revenues derived from ad valorem taxes, as the
port commission thereof may determine, and such revenue bonds not to
be in any manner or to any extent a general obligation of the port
district issuing the same, nor a charge upon the ad valorem tax revenue
of such port district.
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Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) governs relation back of amended
pleadings. It states:
(1) When an Amendment Relates Back. An amendment to a pleading
relates back to the date of the original pleading when:
(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows
relation back;
(8) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out, or attempted to be
set out, in the original pleading; or
(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party
against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1 )(8) is satisfied
and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(b )(2) for serving the
summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment:
(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be
prejudiced in defending on the merits; and
(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have
been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the
proper party's identity.
(3) Joining Real Party in Interest. The relation back of an amendment
joining or substituting a real party in interest is as provided in Rule
17(a).
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) provides,

a) Real Party in Interest.
( 1) Designation in General. An action must be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest. The following may sue in their
own names without joining the person for whose benefit the action
is brought:
(A) an executor;
(8) an administrator;
(C) a personal representative
(D) a guardian;
(E) a bailee;
(F) a trustee of an express trust;
(G) a party with whom or in whose name a contract has
been made for another's benefit; and
(H) a party authorized by statute.
Page 5 of 16
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(2) ....
(3) Joinder of the Real Party in Interest. The court may not dismiss
an action for failure to prosecute in the name of the real party in
interest until, after an objection, a reasonable time has been
allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted
into the action. After ratification, joinder, or substitution, the action
proceeds as if it had been originally commenced by the real party in
interest.

ANALYSIS

1. Adding Plaintiffs after the Statute of Limitations
Idaho Code § 50-2027(2) sets the statute of limitations for challenges to
ordinances approving ordinance renewal plans as thirty days after the effective date of
the ordinance. The statute then clearly states that no ordinance or bonds authorized by
such ordinance shall be brought in any court by any person for any cause whatsoever
after thirty days from the effective date of the ordinance.
Neither party disputes that the effective date of each ordinance was December
20, 2018 or that the Complaint was filed within thirty days of the effective date. Neither
party disputes that the Amended Complaint and the Second Amended Complaint were
filed more than thirty days after the effective date of the ordinances. 4
At issue is whether the additional Plaintiffs (Clint Siegner, Blue Valley Tenant
Association, Christine Brown, Rick Brown, Heather Campbell-Adams, Kathleen Greene,
Gary Hardey, Bonita Hardey, Charlene Landin, Juan Landin, and Joyce Magnuson),
who were added by way of the Amended Complaint and after the thirty-day statute of
limitations, should be dismissed since they did not challenge the ordinances or bonds
authorized by such ordinances within the first thirty days the ordinances were effective.
The City of Boise argues the Amended Complaint does not relate back to the
date of the original Complaint (January 17, 2019), so these additional Plaintiffs did not
timely file claims pursuant to I.C. § 50-2027(2) and must be dismissed. 5 The Plaintiffs
allege the subsequent Plaintiffs' claims are identical to those of the initial Plaintiffs so

4

5

The thirty-day period expired January 19, 2019.
Def's Memo, p. 5.
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the additional Plaintiffs' claims relate back to the Complaint under Rule 15 of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Further, Plaintiffs allege these new plaintiffs resemble

interveners and should be allowed to join under Rules 17(a) and 15.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15 addresses relation back of an amended
pleading that adds claims against new defendants.

The City of Boise is the only

defendant in this proceeding, so there is no question of whether a defendant was given
notice of the action before the statute of limitations ran. Rather, at issue in this case is
whether additional plaintiffs could be joined in this proceeding after the statute of
limitations ran. Therefore, Rule 17(a) is the controlling rule since this rule addresses
joining plaintiffs by amendment.
Rule 17(a)(3) states, "The court may not dismiss an action for failure to prosecute
in the name of the real party in interest until, after an objection, a reasonable time has
been allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted into the action.
After ratification, joinder, or substitution, the action proceeds as if it had been originally
commenced by the real party in interest."
Plaintiffs rely on Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 33 P.3d 816
(2001 ), a wrongful death case, for its proposition that additional plaintiffs could be added
after the statute of limitations ran. This Court notes that Hayward dealt with a
substitution after the statute of limitations had run of heirs of the decedent for the
administratix of the decedent's estate as the proper party in that wrongful death action. 6
Hayward addressed I.R.C.P. 17(a)(1 ), not I.R.C.P. 17(a)(3). The Court in Hayward

emphasized that there were both state and federal proceedings related to Hayward's
death and the federal case included a timely-filed wrongful death claim so the defendant
was on notice of that claim and not surprised or prejudiced by the addition of that claim
in the state court case.

Even the Idaho Supreme Court noted Hayward involved a

" ... unique set of facts presented in this case .... " Hayward, 136 Idaho at 347, 33 P.3d at
821.
There is no parallel proceeding in this case. This is the only suit of which this
court is aware that was filed objecting to these ordinances. Importantly, this suit was
not brought in a representative capacity by an administrator, executor, or heirs. The
6

Pis' Response, p. 9.
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Complaint and its amendments allege each Plaintiff has an individual right of action to
bring his, her or its own claim against the City of Boise.

Further, this was not a

substitution of parties-each additional plaintiff in the Amended Complaint was added in
his, her, or its own capacity and was not substituted for one of the original plaintiffs. So,
this is a joinder of additional plaintiffs after the statute of limitations had run. This fact
pattern falls within I.R.C.P. 17(a)(3).
"The decision to grant motions under Rule 17(a) rests within the trial court's
discretion.

In exercising such discretion the trial court should follow the liberal

construction given Rule 17(a)-encouraging the granting of motions to amend. The
court should also further the policy favoring the just resolution of actions-providing
litigants their day in court." Holmes v. Henderson Oil Co., 102 Idaho 214, 628 P.2d
1048 (1981 )." Conda Partnership, Inc., v. M.D. Const. Co., Inc., 115 Idaho 902, 904,
771 P.2d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 1989). Therefore, the operative question in this case for
the Court is what constitutes "a reasonable time" allowed to join additional plaintiffs.
"Moreover, Rule 17(a) is designed to prevent forfeiture when determination of the
proper party is difficult or when an understandable mistake has been made in selecting
the party plaintiff. Nevertheless, if the real party in interest is not joined or substituted
within a reasonable time, the trial court should dismiss the suit. What constitutes a
reasonable time depends upon the facts of each case." See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1555, at 705, 708-09 (1971 ). In determining a
reasonable time, trial courts should consider the good faith of the plaintiff and the
prejudice, if any, experienced by the defendant. See, e.g., Brohan v. Volkswagen Mfg.

Corp., 97 F.R.D. 46 (E.D.N.Y.1983); Unilever, Ltd. v. MIT Stolt Boe/, 77 F.R.D. 384
(S.D.N.Y.1977); Holmes v. Henderson Oil Co., supra; Chavez v. Regents of the

University of New Mexico, 103 N.M. 606, 711 P.2d 883 (1985)." Conda, 115 Idaho at
904, 771 P.2d at 922.
Still, the Court of Appeals noted in Conda that, "Rule 17(a) is not intended to
validate claims filed without any real basis but with the hope that a proper party will
eventually materialize in order to benefit from suspended statutes of limitation .... " Id.

(citing Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront Partners, Inc., 106 F.3d 11 (2nd Cir.
1997)). Rather, it is intended to "prevent forfeiture when determination of the proper
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party is difficult or when an understandable mistake has been made in selecting the
party plaintiff." Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342, 348, 33 P.3d 816,
822 (2001) (citing Conda, 115 Idaho at 904, 771 P.2d at 922).
In this case, the additional plaintiffs in the Amended Complaint offered no
explanation as to why they could not have been named as plaintiffs in the original
Complaint or why they were mistaken, unable to understand, or unsure of the
underlying facts giving rise to this action. Although Plaintiffs appear to have acted in
good faith, and there is no indication that Boise City has experienced prejudice because
of the delay in naming additional plaintiffs, the Court does not find this is simply an error
of form or mistake. The Amended Complaint only alleges the additional plaintiffs also
have an interest without alleging any error or mistake for failing to include the parties in
the original Complaint.
Idaho Code § 50-2027(2) sets a reasonable time as the statute of limitations of
thirty days. Even applying a broad interpretation, the additional plaintiffs did not provide
the City of Boise of notice within the jurisdictional time limit that they were intending to
raise a claim.

Rather, the additional plaintiffs were added outside the statute of

limitations and have an independent claim against the city (despite being based on
the same facts) so the Amended Complaint does not relate back to the filing of the
original Complaint.

This conclusion is consistent with the strict jurisdictional

limitation provided for in Idaho Code § 50-2027 and the legislature's purpose for
finality of ordinances.
Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Clint Siegner, Blue Valley Tenant Association,
Christine Brown, Rick Brown, Heather Campbell-Adams, Kathleen Greene, Gary
Hardey, Bonita Hardey, Charlene Landin, Juan Landin, and Joyce Magnuson as
plaintiffs in this action.

2. Standing to Challenge the Ordinances
Boise City alleges the Plaintiffs from the original Complaint do not have standing
to challenge the ordinances. The Complaint and Amended Complaint allege that:
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1. Plaintiffs Wayne Hoffman, 7 Fred Birnbaum, Bruce Boyles, Andrea Lanning,
and Bob Tikker have standing to challenge the ordinances as registered
voters, residents and real property owners in the City of Boise, and because
they pay ad valorem taxes to Ada County; and
2. Plaintiff G&G Ventures, LLC, has standing to challenge the ordinances as a
resident and real property owner in the City of Boise, and because it pays ad
valorem taxes to Ada County.
Boise City cited Thomson v. City of Lewiston, in support of the motion to dismiss,
which states three basic propositions of standing:
1. "The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on
the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated."
2. "[T]o satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants
generally must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial
likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the
claimed injury."
3. "[A] citizen and taxpayer may not challenge a governmental enactment
where the injury is one suffered alike by all citizens and taxpayers of the
jurisdiction."
137 Idaho 473, 477, 50 P.3d 488, 492 (2002)(citing Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary
County, 128 Idaho 371, 375, 913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996)). Here, it is clear the injury
alleged-the use of tax proceeds "to fund, pay for, or support, directly or indirectly, the
subject urban renewal plans" 8-is one suffered by all. Thus, the Plaintiffs do not have
standing under Thomson to bring their claims.
In contrast, Plaintiffs argue Thomson does not apply since the Plaintiffs in this
action are alleging a violation of section 3 of Article VI 11 of the Idaho Constitution and
Thomson only challenged an ordinance under Idaho Code § 50-2027. The Plaintiffs
assert the Idaho Supreme Court set the standing requirements for taxpayers seeking
relief on constitutional grounds under section 3 of Article VII I of the Idaho Constitution in
Koch et al. v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 162-163, 177 P.3d 372 (2008).

The Complaint alleged Plaintiff Wayne Hoffman has standing as a registered voter, resident and
real property owner in Ada County and because he pays ad valorem taxes to Ada County. Then, the
Amended Complaint was amended to allege resident of City of Boise.
8
See Amended Complaint ,I 34. Response, p. 4.
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Article VIII, section 3, of the Idaho Constitution states:
No county, city, board of education, or school district, or other subdivision
of the state, shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in any manner, or for
any purpose, exceeding in that year, the income and revenue provided for
it for such year, without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors
thereof voting at an election to be held for that purpose ....
In Koch, the Supreme Court stated it had "never questioned the standing of a taxpayer
to challenge expenditures that allegedly violate Article VIII, § 3." Koch, 145 Idaho at
162, 177 P.3d at 376.

The Koch Court found that, "[t]here is no logical difference

between making an appropriation that is specifically prohibited by the Constitution and
incurring an indebtedness or liability that is specifically prohibited by the Constitution"
and held, "that the Plaintiffs, who are electors and taxpayers of the County, have
standing to challenge whether [a jurisdictional appropriation] violated article VIII, § 3."

Koch, 145 Idaho at 162-63, 177 P.3d at 376-77.
The Plaintiffs alleged in their Amended Complaint9 that:
Ord. 55-18 adopted and provided for "revenue allocation financing" also
known as "tax increment financing" ("TIF") of the Shoreline Plan pursuant
to 1.C. §50-2906 ....
Ord. 58-18 adopted and provided for "revenue allocation financing" also
known as "tax increment financing" ("Tl F") of the Gateway Plan pursuant
to I.C. §50-2906 ....
The commitment by [Boise] City to allocate the TIF to the CCDC for 20
years pursuant to the Ordinances violates Article VI 11, §3 of the Idaho
Constitution and creates by and through said commitment a liability on the
part of the City to the CCDC in violation of the express prohibition
contained in Article VIII, §3 .... 10

9

The Amended Complaint contains nearly identical language to the Complaint excepting that it
includes paragraphs relating to standing for the additional Plaintiffs.
10
Amended Complaint,
22, 24, 33. Basis for this paragraph reads as follows:

,m

27. In promulgating Ord. 55-18, the City committed to providing TIF financing to the
CCDC's estimated "Project Costs" in the sum of $66,500,000.00 for the 20 year duration
of the Shoreline Plan, commencing retroactively from January 1, 2018, through
December 31, 2038. Said financing substantially exceeded the City's annual income and
revenue.
28. In promulgating Ord. 58-18, the City committed to providing TIF financing to the
CCDC's estimated "Project Costs" in the sum of $96,500,000.00 for the 20 year duration
of the Gateway Plan, commencing retroactively from January 1, 2018, through December
31, 2038. Said financing substantially exceeded the City's annual income and revenue.
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Idaho Code § 50-2906 is part of the Local Economic Development Act, Idaho Code §§
50-2901, et seq.
The City argues Koch is readily distinguishable from the facts in this case
because it is the CCDC, not the City of Boise, that may incur indebtedness or liability. 11
The City claims its approval of the Gateway Plan and Shoreline Plan does not cause
Boise City to incur indebtedness or liability. 12
The City also cites Urban Renewal Agency of City of Rexburg v. Hart, 148 Idaho
299, 303, 222 P.3d 467, 471 (2009), in which the Supreme Court found that "urban
renewal agencies are not the alter egos of cities. Therefore, the [Local Economic
Development Act] grant of authority to urban renewal agencies to issue revenue
allocation bonds [did] not violate Article VIII, §§ 3 or 4 of the Idaho Constitution." 148
Idaho 299, 303, 222 P .3d 467, 4 71 (2009)(internal quotes omitted).
Here, the Plaintiffs specifically allege in the Amended Complaint that the
"revenue allocation financing" in the Shoreline and Gateway Urban Renewal Plans
violates Article VIII, §3, of the Idaho Constitution. 13 Because the Idaho Supreme Court
has directly addressed this issue in Urban Renewal Agency of City of Rexburg v. Hart,
and because the Idaho Supreme Court has held that revenue allocation bonds do not
violate section 3 of Article VIII of the Idaho Constitution, the Court finds the City did not
incur indebtedness or liability. Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss and
DISMISSES Plaintiffs' claims in the Amended Complaint that Boise City's commitment

to allocate "revenue allocation financing," also known as "tax increment financing"
("TIF"), to the CCDC for twenty years in Ordinance No. 55-18 for the Shoreline District

29. Both Ord. 55-18 and Ord. 58-18 (the "Ordinances") were passed without the assent of
two-thirds (2/3) of the qualified electors thereof voting at an election to be held for that
purpose as required under Article VII I §3 of the Idaho Constitution for cities and other
subdivisions of the State whenever they incur any indebtedness or liability, other than for
ordinary and necessary expenses, in excess of their income and revenue for the year.
30. In promulgating the Ordinances, the City failed to find or to establish that the subject
revenue allocation financing (TIF financing) for the Shoreline Plan or the Gateway Plan
would be used to fund "ordinary and necessary" expenses of the City as provided and
required under Article VIII §3 of the Idaho Constitution ....
Amended Complaint, 1r,J 27-30.
11
Reply, p. 2.
12
Reply, p. 2.
13
Amended Complaint, 1r,J 22, 24, 33; Complaint, 1J1J 11, 14, 22.
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Urban Renewal Plan and/or Ordinance No. 58-18 for the Gateway East District Urban
Renewal Plan violate Article VI 11, §3 of the Idaho Constitution.
The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the Complaint and
Amended Complaint are dismissed in their entirety. Judgment will be entered for the
Defendant.
3. Attorney Fees

Boise City argues it is entitled to reasonable attorney fees under Idaho Code §
12-117, or in the alternative, Idaho Code § 12-121, for prevailing on the Motion to
Dismiss. 14 Plaintiffs did not address attorney fees issue in their briefing. 15
Because the Court finds it does not have sufficient briefing to determine whether
Boise City is entitled to recover fees for defending against the ComplainUAmended
Complaint, the Court orders the Defendant to file a Memorandum of Costs and Fees
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(4) if it desires an award of attorney
fees. The Plaintiffs may then file any motion to disallow as permitted in Rule 54(d)(5)
under the timeframe required by that rule. The Court reserves any decision on the City's
request for fees until the matter is fully briefed.
CONCLUSION

The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed April 12, 2019, is GRANTED.
The Second Amended Complaint is dismissed in its entirety and stricken from the

record.
The Court dismisses Plaintiffs Clint Siegner, Blue Valley Tenant Association,

Christine Brown, Rick Brown, Heather Campbell-Adams, Kathleen Greene, Gary
Hardey, Bonita Hardey, Charlene Landin, Juan Landin, and Joyce Magnuson from the
Amended Complaint since these additional plaintiffs were added after the statute of
limitations had ran and do not relate back to the date of the filing of the Complaint.
All other claims in the Amended Complaint are dismissed since Defendant's
commitment to allocate "revenue allocation financing," also known as "tax increment
financing" ("Tl F"), to the CCDC for twenty years in Ordinance No. 55-18 for the
Shoreline District Urban Renewal Plan and/or Ordinance No. 58-18 for the Gateway

14
15

Def's Memo, p. 5.
See generally Response.
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East District Urban Renewal Plan did not violate Article VIII, §3 of the Idaho Constitution
under the holding of Urban Renewal Agency of City of Rexburg v. Hart that "urban
renewal agencies are not the alter egos of cities. Therefore, the [Local Economic
Development Act] grant of authority to urban renewal agencies to issue revenue
allocation bonds [did] not violate Article VIII, §§ 3 or 4 of the Idaho Constitution .... "16
The Court will enter a separate Judgment for the Defendant. Any memorandum
of cost and fees or motion to disallow must be filed pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54.
ORDERED

Signed: 7/12/2019 02:14 PM

~

Lynn Norton

District Judge

16

Urban Renewal Agency of City of Rexburg v. Hart, 148 Idaho 299, 303, 222 P.3d 467, 471

(2009).
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this day I served a copy of the attached to: July 12, 2019
John L. Runft

jrunft@runftsteele.com

[X] E-mail

Scott Muir

BoiseCityAttorney@cityofboise.org

[X] E-mail

July 15, 2019
Wayne Hoffman
4 772 S Cochees Ave
Boise ID 83709

l ✓~

By mail

Fred S Birnbaum
4378 W Quail Pt Ct
Boise ID 83703

L✓j

By mail

Andrea Lanning
385 W Charlwood Ct
Boise ID 83706

..✓~

By mail

Bob Tikker
369 S Winthrop Pl
Boise ID 83709

..✓J

By mail

Bruce C Boyles
136 E Williams St
Boise ID 83706

;t'] By mail

G&G Ventures LLC
PO Box 1393
Eagle ID 83616

r✓

Clint Stewart Siegner
5072 N High Country Way
Star ID 83669

[~ By mail

Blue Valley Tenant Association
8301 Blue Heaven LN
Boise ID 83716

l ✓•

By mail

By mail

Christine Brown
8513 Blue Mountain
Boise ID 83716
Rick Brown
8513 Blue Mountain LN
Boise ID 83716
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:< By mail

Heather D Campbell-Adams
** Confidential Address **
Kathleen Ann Greene
2271 Blue Lake LN
Boise ID 83716

L✓ j

Gary Hardey
8301 Blue Heaven LN
Boise ID 83716

p/ By mail

Bonita L Hardey
8301 Blue Heaven LN
Boise ID 83716

•.✓J

By mail

Charlene Landin
1973 Blue Sage LN
Boise ID 83716

•.✓J

By mail

Juan V Landin
1973 Blue Sage LN
Boise ID 83716

r✓- By mail

Joyce L Magnuson
2038 Blue Spruce LN
Boise ID 83716

_✓_

By mail

By mail

Phil McGrane
Clerk of the Court
Dated:

July 12, 2019

By:

Tanine Xorsen
Deputy Clerk
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Electronically Filed
7/26/2019 10:11 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Amy King, Deputy Clerk

JOHN L. RUNFT (ISB # 1059)
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Phone: (208) 333-8506
Fax: (208) 343-3246
Email: JRunft@runftsteele.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

WAYNE HOFFMAN, an individual; FREDERIC
S. BIRNBAUM, an individual; BRUCE C.
BOYLES, an individual; G&G VENTURES, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company; ANDREA
LANNING, an individual; and BOB TIKKER, an
individual,
Plaintiffs,

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
AMEND AND ALTER
JUDGMENT

vs.

Rules 59(e) and 60(b )(1)

Case No. CV0I-19-01127

THE CITY OF BOISE, IDAHO; a municipal
corporation and a political sub-division of the State
of Idaho.
Defendant.

COME NOW the above named Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record, John L.
Runft of the firm ofRunft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC, and move this Court pursuant to IRCP Rule
59(e) and 60(b )(1) to reconsider its order granting the City's Motion to Dismiss and alter its Decision

and Order and Final Judgment, and thereby to issue an Order (i) denying the City's Motion to
Dismiss; (ii) reversing and vacating its order striking the Second Amended Complaint, and (iii)
allowing the parties who were added as additional plaintiffs in the Amended Complaint for
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Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and in the Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Reliefto proceed as Plaintiffs in this action. This Motion is supported by Plaintiffs' brief
and the Declaration ofJohn L. Runft filed herewith in support hereof.
DATED this 26 th day of July 2019.

RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

/S/ John Runft
JOHN L. RUNFT
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this 26th day of July, 2019, I filed the foregoing electronically through the iCourt
system, which caused the following parties or counsel to be served by electronic means, as more
fully reflected on the Notice of Electronic Filing:

Jayme B. Sullivan
Boise City Attorney

boisecityattorney@cityofboise.org

Scott B. Muir
Deputy City Attorney
Kevin S. Borger
Deputy City Attorney
City of Boise
Office of the City Attorney
PO Box 500
Boise, Idaho 83701

RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

/S/ John Runft
JOHN L. RUNFT
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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Electronically Filed
7/26/2019 10:11 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Amy King, Deputy Clerk

JOHN L. RUNFT (ISB # 1059)
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Phone: (208) 333-8506
Fax: (208) 343-3246
Email: JRunft@runftsteele.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

WAYNE HOFFMAN, an individual; FREDERIC
S. BIRNBAUM, an individual; BRUCE C.
BOYLES, an individual; G&G VENTURES, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company; ANDREA
LANNING, an individual; and BOB TIKKER, an
individual,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV0I-19-01127

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
AMEND AND ALTER
JUDGMENT

vs.

Rules 59(e) and 60(b )(1)
THE CITY OF BOISE, IDAHO; a municipal
corporation and a political sub-division of the State
of Idaho.
Defendant.

COME NOW the above named Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record, John L.
Runft of the firm ofRunft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC, and respectfully submit this briefin support
of their motion, pursuant to IRCP Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b)(l), for reconsideration of the Court's

Decision and Order and Final Judgment granting the City's Motion to Dismiss, striking the Second
Amended Complaint, dismissing Plaintiffs added after the initial Complaint, and to issue an Order (i)

Brief is Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment; Page 1 of 22

000064

denying the City's Motion to Dismiss; (ii) to reverse and vacate its order striking the Second

Amended Complaint; and (iii) to allowing the parties who were added as additional Plaintiffs in the
Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint to proceed as Plaintiffs in the action. The
Declaration ofJohn L. Runft is filed in support hereof and is incorporated herein.

I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Following filing of the initial Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief on January
17th, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief on March
11 th , 2019, prior to the filing of any responsive pleading. The Amended Complaint, in paragraph 34,
added detailed expression of Plaintiffs' opposition to the City's use of tax increment financing for
the subject twenty (20) year projects without an affirmative vote by two-thirds of the qualified
electors' approving said projects, and it also joined additional Plaintiffs. On March 28th, 2019,
Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, which purported
to join additional parties as Plaintiffs following written permission by the City's counsel.
On April 12th , 2019, the City filed its Motion to Dismiss pursuant to IRCP Rule 12(b)(l) and
(6) and supported by a legal memorandum ("City Memo"). On May 1oth, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a

Response to the Motion to Dismiss. On May 20 th , 2019, the City filed a Reply. On May 22nd , 2019, a
hearing was held before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. On July 12th , 2019, the Court
entered its Decision and Order striking the Second Amended Complaint, dismissing the Amended

Complaint, and entered a Final Judgment of Dismissal.
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II.
ARGUMENT
1.
I.R.C.P. Rule 59(e) is the appropriate procedural vehicle for a motion to reconsider an
Order of Dismissal regarding matters addressed to the Court prior to Judgment and I.R.C.P.
Rule 60(b)(1) is for reconsideration on grounds of mistake, inadvertence, or neglect where new
issues or new information is presented.
A motion to reconsider a dismissal order should be treated as a motion to alter or amend a
judgment under I.R.C.P. 59(e) if the motion was filed within fourteen (14) days after the entry of
judgment. Ross v. State, 141 Idaho 670, 115 P.3rd 761 (Ct. App. 2005); Obray v. Mitchell, 98 Idaho
533, 567 P.2d 1284 (1977) A decision to grant relief under this rule rests in the sound discretion of
the Court and provides a trial Court with a mechanism to correct legal and factual errors in
proceedings before it. Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 979 P.2d 107 (1999). In
proceeding under Rule 59(e), the Court must (1) correctly perceive the issue as discretionary, (2) act
within the bounds of discretion and apply the correct legal standards, and (3) reach the decision
through an exercise of reason." Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 291 P.3d 1000, (2012);
O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008). When the
judgment or order is final and appealable, and not an interlocutory order, the court in ruling on a
motion for reconsideration may not consider new facts. PHH Mortg. Services Corp. v. Perreira, 146
Idaho 631, 200 P.3d 1180, (2009). Accordingly, in sections 2 and 3 below Plaintiffs proceed under
I.R.C.P. 59(e), since the facts and issues raised and argued therein deal with matters addressed to the
Court prior to the entry of the Memorandum Decision and Judgment.
However, where a motion for “reconsideration” raises new issues, or new information not
addressed to the Court before the decision that resulted in a judgment, the proper procedure is to
proceed under IRCP Rule 60(b)(1). Low v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 646 P.2d 1030 (1982), Johnson v.
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Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100 (Ct. App. 2006). The decision to grant or deny relief
pursuant to a Rule 60(b) motion is within the sound discretion of the trial court and, absent a
manifest abuse of that discretion, such decision ordinarily will not be disturbed on appeal. PHH
Mortgage v. Nickerson, 160 Idaho 388, 374 P.3d 551, (2016); Printcraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside
Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440, 448, 283 P.3d 757, 765 (2012); Thomas v. Thomas, 119 Idaho
709, 809 P.2d 1188, (App. 1991). In sections 3 and 4 below Plaintiffs proceed under I.R.C.P. Rule
60(b)(1), since new facts and issues are presented.
2.
The Court erred by conflating the City’s liability with that of CCDC, which is not
subject to the restrictions of Article VIII §3 of the Idaho Constitution.
The sole ground asserted by the City in its Motion to Dismiss was that Plaintiffs lacked
standing. In its opening brief the City relied on the traditional rule that citizens and taxpayers do not
have standing to challenge governmental enactment where the injury is one suffered alike by all
citizens and taxpayers of the jurisdiction, citing the holdings of the Idaho Supreme Court in Thomson
v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002) and Miles v. Idaho Power Co, 116 Idaho 635,
778 P.2d 757 (1989). Plaintiffs countered in their Response that the Idaho Supreme Court carved out
a new exception to the standard requirements for standing for taxpayers of a jurisdiction seeking
relief on constitutional grounds in Koch et al. v, Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 162-163, 177 P. 3d
372 (2008), a case which is subsequent to all authority cited by the City. In Koch, the Court
explained that the exception to the general rule is “jurisdictional” and has long been made with
regard to Article VIII § 3 of the Idaho Constitution:
For over one-hundred years this Court has entertained taxpayer or citizen
challenges based upon that constitutional provision (numerous cases cited). Even
though standing is jurisdictional and may be raised at any time, including on
appeal, Beach Lateral Water Users Ass'n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 130 P.3d
1138 (2006), this Court has never questioned the standing of a taxpayer to
Brief is Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment; Page 4 of 22
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challenge expenditures that allegedly violate Article VIII, § 3.
Koch, 145 Idaho at 162, 177 P.3d at 376

The Court in Koch left no doubt that this constitutional standing exception prohibiting a
municipality from incurring excessive debt or liability without the requisite voter approval applies in
the present case to the City's allocating the incremental tax revenues to the CCDC. In this respect
the court stated:
There is no logical difference between making an appropriation that is specifically
prohibited by the Constitution and incurring an indebtedness or liability that is
specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Id. 145 Idaho at 162-163, 177 P.3d 376377.

The City alleged in its Reply that the Koch exception does not apply in the present case for
the following two reasons: "Here the Complaint does not allege, and there are no facts that would
support an allegation, that the City of Boise incurred any indebtedness or liability by promulgating
Ordinance No. 58-18 ("Gateway Plan") or Ordinance No. 55-18 ("Shoreline Plan")." The City is
wrong on both counts. First, the Amended Complaint expressly alleges in Count One, paragraph 36
that the City's promulgation of the Ordinances "violates the provisions Article VIII §3 of the Idaho
Constitution prohibiting a city or any sub-division of the state municipality from incurring, outside of
"ordinary and necessary expenses," an indebtedness or liability exceeding income and revenue for a
specific year without the assent of qualified electors" (emphasis applied).

Second, Plaintiffs do

allege in paragraphs 27, 28, and 33 of the Amended Complaint facts supporting its claim that the City
incurred an indebtedness or liability as a result of the City's commitment in said Ordinances to
provide tax increment financing to the CCDC to finance the projects (including the bonds), without
voter approval, and in so doing assumed an unconstitutional liability:
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27.
In promulgating Ord. 55-18, the City committed to providing TIF financing to
the CCDC’s estimated “Project Costs” in the sum of $66,500,000.00 for the 20 year
duration of the Shoreline Plan, commencing retroactively from January 1, 2018,
through December 31, 2038. Said financing substantially exceeded the City’s annual
income and revenue.
28.
In promulgating Ord. 58-18, the City committed to providing TIF financing to
the CCDC’s estimated “Project Costs” in the sum of $96,500,000.00 for the 20 year
duration of the Gateway Plan, commencing retroactively from January 1, 2018,
through December 31, 2038. Said financing substantially exceeded the City’s annual
income and revenue.
33.
The commitment by the City to allocate the TIF to the CCDC for 20 years
pursuant to the Ordinances violates Article VIII, §3 of the Idaho Constitution and
creates by and through said commitment a liability on the part of the City to the
CCDC in violation of the express prohibition contained in Article VIII, §3, to wit:
“No county, city, board of education, or school district, or other subdivision of the
state, shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in any manner, or for any purpose,
exceeding in that year, the income and revenue provided for it for such year…..”

Plaintiffs claim that the City’s commitment to the CCDC to allocate some of its tax revenue
on a long term basis to provide the CCDC with a long-term revenue stream to fund its projects and
its related non- recourse revenues bonds constitutes an obligation by the City to the CCDC.
Moreover, the obligation was unconstitutionally so assumed. Further, any obligation has a liability
component. Inherent in the concept of liability is the element of contingencies. For example, what if
a subsequent City Council rescinded the subject Ordinances or modified them in a manner not to the
CCDC’s liking, such as halting or interfering with the TIF revenue flow? Would the City liable to
the CCDC for the consequences of such action? The issue of the nature of this obligation and
consequent liability is discussed further below.
The City read the decision in Urban Renewal Agency of City of Rexburg v. Hart, 222 P.3d
467, 148 Idaho 299 (Idaho 2009), as somehow dispelling the City’s obligation and consequent
liability arising from its TIF commitment to the CCDC. This Court apparently agreed with the City.
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In this respect, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Court has mistakenly compounded the authority
of the CCDC, an urban renewal agency, to obligate itself by issuing revenue bonds funded by
"revenue allocation financing" (or "tax increment financing") pursuant to the Local Economic
Development Act LC. 50-2901, et seq., with the constitutionally restricted authority of the City to
incur an obligation or liability without an affirmative vote by two-thirds of the qualified electors
approving said funding. The Court also points to the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Hart as
supporting its ruling in the present case.
Plaintiffs submit that not only does the Supreme Court's holding in Hart not apply to the
issue of the City's alleged liability for its commitment to the urban renewal agency to provide TIF
funding, but that the Court in Hart expressly abstained from delving into that issue. The issue of the
City's alleged unconstitutional liability based on its commitment to provide TIF funding to the urban
renewal agency was raised as one of the two primary issues that were briefed and argued in Hart (the
other issue being the "alter-ego" issue.). However, Plaintiff Hart, initially appearingpra se, failed to
file his challenge to the Local Economic Development Act LC. 50-2901, et seq., within the required
thirty (30) days, with the result that the Court declined to address this issue. See, Hart, 148 Idaho
301, 222 P.3d 469. See also Footnote 1: "Many of Hart's arguments are challenges to the City's
enactment of Ordinance No. 950. We are not free to reach the merits of his challenges to the
ordinance." This issue remains un-addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. The point here is that
this issue, which is the issue in the present case, was knowingly and expressly not addressed in Hart.
Accordingly, the Court in Hart addressed only the "alter ego" issue in the context of the
authority of the urban renewal agency (not the City) to approve and issue revenue bonds.
Thus, we consider only whether the district court erred in confirming the validity of
the Agency's resolution approving the bond purchase agreement and authorizing the
issuance of revenue allocation bonds, the bond purchase agreement, and the bonds
Brief is Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment; Page 7 of 22
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that the Agency proposes to sell to Zions.
Id., at 148 Idaho 301, 222 P.3d 469.

In pursuing the “alter ego” issue in that case, Hart argued that the urban renewal agency's use
of revenue allocation financing was really an action undertaken by the city, because the agency was
merely an "alter ego" of the city arising from the fact that the former appointed themselves to serve
on the latter. Thus, Hart argued, as an alter ego of the city, the urban renewal agencies' use of
revenue allocation financing violates Article VIII, §§ 3 and 4 of the Idaho Constitution. The Court in
Hart disagreed, essentially on the proposition that the same people can wear different hats and serve
in multiple positions. Significantly, the Court found that “(E)ven as amended, the Law does not
allow a city to usurp the powers and duties of the urban renewal agency (Hart, 148 Idaho 301, 222
P.3d 469). The Court concluded:
Urban renewal agencies are not the " alter egos" of cities under the Law, and thus an
agency's issuance of revenue allocation bonds does not violate Article VIII, §§ 3 or 4
of the Idaho Constitution.
Id. 148 Idaho 303; 222 P.3d 471
Hence, as independent public bodies corporate and politic pursuant to Idaho Code §502006(a), urban renewal agencies are distinct legal entities with independent authority and are not
subdivisions of the state within the meaning of Sections 3 or 4 of Article 8 of the Idaho Constitution.
Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong, 94 Idaho 876, 881-882, 499 P.2d 575, 581 (1972)
Moreover, the proposed revenue allocation bonds do not fall within the constitutional terms of
“indebtedness” or “liability,” because of the amendment to Article VIII, §1, providing that urban
renewal agencies are exempt from the operation of the vote requirements of Article VIII, §3. Thus,
what urban renewal agencies can do pursuant to Idaho Code §50-2006, such as issue revenue bonds,
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is quite different from what a subdivision of the State, such as the City of Boise, can do under the
constraints of Article VIII, § 3.
On page 12 of its Memorandum Decision and Order herein the Court found that the

Amended Complaint alleged that the subject "revenue allocation financing" violated Article VIII, §3
of the Idaho Constitution:
Here, the Plaintiffs specifically allege in the Amended Complaint that the "revenue
allocation financing" in the Shoreline and Gateway Urban Renewal Plans violates
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. (footnote 13 references paragraphs
22, 24,and 33 in the Amended Complaint).

Paragraphs 22, 24, and 33 in the Amended Complaint state as follows:
22.
Ord. 55-18 adopted and provided for "revenue allocation financing" also
known as "tax increment financing" ("TIF") of the Shoreline Plan pursuant to LC.
§50-2906.

On December 18, 2018, the City passed Ordinance No. 58-18 ("Ord. 58-81")
24.
approving the Gateway East District Urban Renewal Plan ("Gateway Plan") that was
developed by and presented to the City for approval by the CCDC.
33.
The commitment by the City to allocate the TIF to the CCDC for 20 years
pursuant to the Ordinances violates Article VIII, §3 of the Idaho Constitution and
creates by and through said commitment a liability on the part of the City to the
CCDC in violation of the express prohibition contained in Article VIII, §3, to wit:
"No county, city, board of education, or school district, or other subdivision of the
state, shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in any manner, or for any purpose,
exceeding in that year, the income and revenue provided for it for such year. ... "
(Emphasis supplied)
In reviewing the allegations in these three paragraphs of the Amended Complaint, it is clear that
Plaintiffs claim that the alleged violation arises from the unconstitutional manner in which the City
went about committing to allocate the TIF to the CCDC pursuant to its ordinances by failing to get
voter approval. Nowhere in their pleadings do Plaintiffs contend that "revenue allocation financing"
("TIF") or "revenue allocation bonds" per se violates Article VIII, §3. Indeed, if the City had
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obtained the requisite voter approval, there would be no objection to the use of revenue allocation
financing of the subject urban renewal projects. The liability that a city can constitutionally assume
is substantially different in amount, kind, and applicable constraints from that of an urban renewal
agency and they cannot be conflated into a single standard.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs submit that the Court erred in reaching the following
conclusions of fact and law, upon which it bases its dismissal:
Because the Idaho Supreme Court has directly addressed this issue in Urban
Renewal Agency of City of Rexburg v. Hart, and because the Idaho Supreme
Court has held that revenue allocation bonds do not violate Section 3 of
Article VIII of the Idaho Constitution, the Court Finds that the City did not
incur indebtedness or liability.
Specifically, as discussed above, the Court in Hart expressly abstained from ruling on this
issue. Further, the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court has held that revenue allocation bonds do not
violate Section 3 of Article VIII of the Idaho Constitution does not serve to legitimize such bonds if
they are illegally issued. By rejecting the alter ego claim, the decision in Hart freed urban renewal
agencies from the restrictive effects of the constitutional restraints imposed on municipal
corporations by Article III §3. It did not free Cities from compliance with said constitutional
restraints when engaged with urban renewal agencies in the issuance of revenue allocation bonds.
The Hart decision simply did not address the City’s liability raised in Plaintiffs’ pleadings.
3.
The commitment by the City to the CCDC to provide TIF funding of its projects
constitutes an obligation that creates a liability, which in this case is unconstitutional for lack
of voter approval, thus rendering the Local Economic Development Act as applied
unconstitutional.
The primary issue in this case is whether a municipality violates Article VIII, § 3 of the Idaho
Constitution when it undertakes an obligation to provide revenue allocation financing (“TIF”) to an
urban renewal agency, which provides to the urban renewal agency a long-term revenue stream by
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means of passing, without the requisite approval of the qualified electors, an ordinance containing a
“revenue allocation financing provision” pursuant to I.C. §§ 50-2904 – 50-2906 of the Local
Economic Development (the “Act”). This is precisely the issue which was briefed and argued in
Hart, but which the Court expressly identified and declined to address. Plaintiffs aver that this
obligation logically and actually creates a resulting liability which, as discussed below, is of a sort
unique to Idaho. In the present case, Plaintiffs claim that the City created such an illegal obligation
and liability when it promulgated Ordinance Nos. 55-18 and 58-18 under I.C. § 50-2906 approving
the Plans that contained a revenue allocation financing provision without the requisite voter
approval.
The only way an urban renewal plan containing a revenue allocation financing provision can
be approved and effectuated is for the municipality to enact an ordinance pursuant to I.C. § 50-2906.
After the ordinance has been enacted, the revenues allocated to the urban renewal agency pursuant to
the ordinance “shall be paid to the agency by the treasurer of the county in which the revenue
allocation district is located. . . .” I.C. § 50-2908(3). It is clear by this language that the function of
the county treasurer in making payment of said allocated funds is ministerial in nature. The
municipality’s role in making and controlling the allocation is further emphasized by the fact that the
municipality is “empowered to adopt, at any time, a revenue allocation financing provision” and
thereafter modify it. I.C. § 50-2904. The plain language of the Act provides that it is the
municipality that allocates the tax increment financing and is “empowered” to do so by enacting an
ordinance adopting a revenue allocation financing provision. I.C. §§ 50-2904 – 2906. And, the City
of Boise did so in this case, but without voter approval.
Therefore, the Act is unconstitutional as applied in this case, since by its use by the City has
created a liability without approval of the qualified electors in violation of Article VIII, Section 3 of
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the Idaho Constitution. The liability arises once the City agrees by ordinance to supply the revenue
stream to the CCDC under the Act. The CCDC relies on that funding commitment in proceeding
forward with its projects under the urban renewal plans. Thus a promissory liability is created as set
forth in a written document: the ordinance. The CCDC undoubtedly relies on this promised
financing for its projects as well as its own solvency. If this promise is not kept, the CCDC would
have a cause of action against the City for breach of contract. To argue that third parties, such as the
“non-recourse” bond holders, cannot sue the CCDC or the City as a result of the failure of the
projects because of the City’s default does not lessen the CCDC’s claim against the City. The CCDC
is a legal entity, and, as such, can sue for breach of contract like any other person who relies on the
performance of a contract to its detriment.
Plaintiffs aver that the taxpayers of the City are burdened with potential exposure which
could result in a judgment being obtained by the CCDC against the City as the result of the City’s
default. Describing the exposure as “hypothetical,” does not vitiate the presence of a liability. The
exposure that defines the liability is based on the City’s obligation to perform its promise to provide
the revenue stream for the term of the urban renewal plan. The CCDC relies on that obligation and
could suffer severe loss, devaluation of its bonds, or insolvency if the City breached that promise.
One cannot dispel the liability by claiming that the City would never breach its promise. At some
time during the passage of the years in this long-term financing arrangement, a subsequent City
administration could become dissatisfied with the CCDC and one or more projects and under I.C. §
50-2904 repeal the Ordinance or modify it to the disliking of the CCDC. It is axiomatic that
obligations, particularly long-term financial obligations, create exposure and therefore a liability.
There is no specific requirement that for the liability to be recognized, one must describe precisely
how the breach would occur and the nature of the losses inflicted by the liability. As a matter of
Brief is Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment; Page 12 of 22
000075

reason and logic, the parameters of the liability are manifested by the nature and character of the
obligation.
In order to properly comprehend the nature and scope of the concept of"liability" under the

provisions of Article VIII, §3 of the Idaho Constitution, it is appropriate once again to review the its
exact applicable language:
No ..... city ..... shall incur any indebtedness or liability in any manner, or for any
purpose exceeding in that year, the income and revenue provided for it for such year
without the assent of two-thirds (2/3) of the qualified electors thereof voting at an
election to be held for that purpose, nor unless, before or at the time of incurring such
indebtedness, provisions shall be made for the collection of an annual tax sufficient
to pay the interest on such indebtedness as it falls due, and also to constitute a sinking
fund for the payment of the principal thereof, within thirty (30) years from the time of
contracting the same. Any indebtedness or liability incurred contrary to this
provision shall be void: provided that this Section shall not be construed to apply to
the ordinary and necessary expenses authorized by the general laws of the state .....
The constitutional history ofldaho clearly demonstrates that the framers intended to severely
limit the ability of local government to incur indebtedness. See, Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention, Vol. 1, pp. 590-593. The Idaho Supreme Court has emphasized that the framers of the
Idaho Constitution "employed more sweeping and prohibitive language in the framing of Section 3
of Article VIII, and pronounce a more positive prohibition against excessive indebtedness, than is to
be found in any other constitution ..... " Feil v. City ofCoeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643, 648649 (1912) (emphasis supplied). For over a century, despite being the subject of frequent litigation,
the applicable restrictive provisions of Article VIII, § 3 remain substantially unaltered. These
limitations have been strictly applied by this Court. See, Dennis Colson, Idaho's Constitution, pp.
105-110; 198-202 (1991).
It needs mentioning that there are numerous cases in other jurisdictions which uphold tax
increment or "revenue allocation" financing of urban renewal plans without the constitutional
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restrictions imposed in Idaho. These cases are inapplicable, because the Idaho Appellate Courts have
continually held throughout the years that Idaho strictly construes this provision and does not follow
other jurisdictions' interpretations. Millerv. City ofBuhl, 48 Idaho 668,284 P. 843,845 (1930); Feil

v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643 (1912). Many cases have presented policy
arguments to the Court (what ought to be) in urging recommended outcomes. Nevertheless, the
"outcome oriented" philosophy of other jurisdictions has been rejected by Idaho Appellate Courts.
They have strictly adhered to the historical construction of this constitutional provision. The Court

in Boise Development Co. v. City of Boise, 26 Idaho 347, 143 P. 531, 535 (1914) stated in
commenting on a California court's outcome-oriented philosophy:
[W]hen the court attempts by argument to escape the force and effect of the
constitutional provision under consideration and show that the city incurred no
liability under the contract; we submit that its reasoning is not sound.
Accordingly, the Idaho Supreme Court has limited its analysis of this constitutional provision
to considering and applying only Idaho cases. The Court noted in Feil that the Idaho Constitution
"not only prohibits incurring any indebtedness, but it also prohibits incurring any liability in any
manner or for any purpose, exceeding the yearly income and revenue. Feil, supra 23 Idaho at 50, 129
P. at 649 (emphasis added). Moreover, the term "liability" has been interpreted by the Idaho Courts
to be much more sweeping and comprehensive than the term "indebtedness." Feil, supra 23 Idaho at
50, 129 P. at 649; see also, Boise Development Co., supra 26 Idaho 347, 143 P. 531; Straughan v.

City of Coeur d'Alene, 53 Idaho 494, 24 P.2d 321 (1932).
The Court in Feil defined the term "liability" to include "the state of being bound or
obligated in law or justice to do, pay, or make good something; legal responsibility .... " Id. 23 Idaho
at 50, 129 P. at 649. Undoubtedly, this definition would include the exposure created by the City's
promise to the CCDC to provide a stream of funding and to continue to maintain it for the duration
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of the term of the urban renewal plan as set forth in the Ordinances. Any claim that the City's
ordinance allocating the incremental tax revenues to the CCDC is somehow different than the
incurring of a debt or liability was rejected by the Court in Koch v, Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158,
162-163, 177 P. 3d 372 (2008). In this respect the court stated:
There is no logical difference between making an appropriation that is specifically
prohibited by the Constitution and incurring an indebtedness or liability that is
specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Koch at pp. 162-163.
The Feil Court undertook to explain the extent and severity the constitutional limitations
under Article VIII, Section 3, as follows:
The framers of our Constitution were not content to say that "no city shall incur any
indebtedness in any manner or for any purpose," but they rather preferred to say that
"no city shall incur any indebtedness or liability in any manner, or for any purpose."
It must be clear to the ordinary mind, on reading this language that the framers of the
Constitution meant to cover all kinds and character of debts and obligations for
which a city may become bound, and to preclude circuitous and evasive methods of
incurring debts and obligations to be met by the city or its inhabitants. (Emphasis
supplied) Id. 23 Idaho 32, 49-50, 129 P. 643, 648-49
The strict construction of Article VIII, Section 3 set forth above by Court in Feil has been
continually reasserted and upheld by the Idaho Supreme Court. Most recently, in Koch v. Canyon

County, 145 Idaho 158, 177 P.3d 372 (2008) the Court cited the holding in Feil and explained the
primary purpose and objectives of Article VIII, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution as follows:
Article VIII,§ 3, was designed primarily to protect taxpayers and citizens of political
subdivisions. Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 49-50, 129 P. 643, 648-49
(1912). They are the ones who would bear the consequences of the subdivision
incurring excessive indebtedness. In order to do so, the framers of our Constitution
granted the qualified electors of the political subdivision the constitutional right to
vote upon whether the subdivision could incur indebtedness or liabilities exceeding
its income and revenue for the year. It cannot do so "without the assent of two-thirds
of the qualified electors thereof voting at an election to be held for that purpose."
It is not sufficient to simply say that the issue should be left to the political process.

With some exceptions, Article VIII, § 2, requires a two-thirds vote of the qualified
electors to approve an expenditure, while officials violating the Constitution's
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spending restraints can retain their positions by a simple majority vote. Thus, leaving
the matter to the political process would, in effect, change the required two-thirds
vote to a simple majority.
Koch at p. 162.
The legal responsibility of the City expressed in the Ordinances to provide and maintain the
promised revenue stream to the CCDC throughout the twenty-year duration of the terms of the
subject urban renewal plans is the mirror image of the liability of the City to the CCDC. Whether the
liability is large or small or contingent is irrelevant under the applicable strict Idaho constitutional
standard. There is nothing anywhere in the record or in the law that serves to preclude or prevent the
City’s exposure to this liability. To allow the City to incur such a liability without the approval of
2/3 of the vote of the qualified electors voting clearly violates Article VIII, §3 of the Idaho
Constitution.
Pursuant to the provisions of IRCP Rule 59(e), the Court is respectfully requested to exercise
its discretion, to reconsider and alter the Court’s Decision and Order and Final Judgment granting
the City’s Motion to Dismiss by vacating same and entering an Order Denying the City’s Motion to
Dismiss.
4.
Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) the Court is requested to reverse and vacate its order striking
the Second Amended Complaint.
Plaintiffs move the Court to pursuant to IRCP Rule 60(b)(1) to reconsider, reverse, and
vacate its ruling striking the Second Amended Complaint on the ground of mistake and / or
inadvertence, coupled with the fact Plaintiffs that complied with the provisions of IRCP Rule 15(2)
by obtaining the opposing party’s written consent to so amend, as is further set forth in the
Declaration of John L. Runft filed in support hereof, which contains copies of said written consent.
As stated in the Declaration of John L. Runft, after carefully taking the steps to acquire opposing
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party’s written consent to file the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs’ counsel mistakenly and / or
inadvertently believed that sufficient record had been made to the Court evidencing that the
appropriate procedural steps had been taken in complying with Rule 15(2) in conjunction with City’s
acceptance of service of the Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs request that relief be granted
under Rule 60(b)(1) for the reasons that the requisite written consent was actually, and timely,
obtained in compliance with IRCP Rule 15(2), that the consent was given before the City responded,
that the City made no objection when it responded, that the City will suffer no prejudice by vacation
of the Strike Order, and that the ends of justice would be best served by granting the requested relief.
Mistakes of fact are subject to a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, not mistakes of law. PHH Mortgage
v. Nickerson, 160 Idaho 388, 374 P.3d 551, (2016); Stirm v. Puckett, 107 Idaho 1046, 695 P.2d 431,
(App. 1985). The question of whether Plaintiffs’ counsel in the present case acted sufficiently to
provide the Court with evidence of an established fact is a matter of fact itself. Plaintiffs submit that
in light of the above reasons, the failure of Plaintiffs’ counsel to provide sufficient evidence to the
Court of the actual compliance with the provisions of Rule 15(2) under the circumstance of this case
constitute mistake or excusable neglect. The Idaho Appellate Courts have concurred that there is not
a precise definition of the term “excusable neglect” nor a satisfactory conceptual basis to segregate it
entirely from a "mistake." Schraufnagel v. Quinowski, 113 Idaho 753, 747 P.2d 775, (App. 1987);
Stirm v. Puckett, 107 Idaho 1046, 695 P.2d 431, (App. 1985). In this respect, the Court in Stirm
stated:
We turn to the question of "excusable neglect". Our research has not disclosed a
precise definition of this term nor a satisfactory conceptual basis to segregate it
entirely from a "mistake". Indeed, under some circumstances the failure to file a
proper pleading may be treated both as a mistake and as excusable neglect. E.g., A.F.
Dormeyer Co. v. M.J. Sales & Distributing Co., 461 F.2d 40 (7th Cir.1972).
Conversely, where relief for a mistake has been denied because the mistake was one
of law rather than of fact, our Supreme Court has taken care also to note that the
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circumstances did not show excusable neglect. See Kingsbury v. Brown, 60 Idaho
464, 473-74, 92 P.2d 1053, 1057 (1939) (applying statute similar to Rule 60(b)).
This overlap between mistake and excusable neglect necessarily implies the
existence of cases where an act or omission might be treated as a mistake of law but
also could be treated as excusable neglect. In the federal courts, for example, a
default judgment has been set aside where a defendant failed to answer upon the
erroneous assumption that a co-defendant's answer would suffice. United States v. 96
Cases of Fireworks, 244 F.Supp. 272 (D.C.W.D.Ohio 1965). Defendants have been
relieved from default judgments when their written responses to complaints were sent
to the plaintiffs but not to the courts. Kinnear Corp. v. Crawford Door Sales Co., 49
F.R.D. 3 (D.C.S.C.1970); Woods v. Severson, 9 F.R.D. 84 (D.C.Neb.1948).
Id at 690
Examples of such mistake or inadvertence referred to in Rule 60(b)(1) were mentioned in in
Berg v. Kendall, 147 Idaho 571, 577, 212 P.3d 1001, 1007 (2009, as applying “primarily to errors or
omissions committed by an attorney or by the court that are not apparent in the record. Silsby v.
Kepner, 140 Idaho 410, 411, 95 P.3d 28, 29 (2004). Any claim of mistake must be a mistake of fact
and not a mistake of law. Gro-Mor, Inc. v. Butts, 109 Idaho 1020, 1023, 712 P.2d 721, 724
(Ct.App.1985). The conduct constituting excusable neglect must be that which would be expected of
a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances. Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 709, 117
P.3d 120, 123 (2005).
Plaintiffs submit that in the light of the facts presented, and “examined in the light of the
facts presented, and the circumstances surrounding the same,” the requested relieve should be
granted and the order striking the Second Amend Complaint vacated. Schraufnagel, 113 Idaho at
755, 747 P.2 at 777.
5.
Pursuant to Rule 59(e) the Court is requested to reconsider its exercise of its discretion
under Rule 17(a) and reverse and vacate its order dismissing the parties joined as Plaintiffs in
the Amended and Second Amended Complaints that were filed after the tolling of the
applicable 30 day statutes of limitation in I.C. 50-2027(2) and I.C. 502911(2).
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Here, Plaintiffs request the Court to reconsider its exercise of its discretion and allow said
taxpayer citizens of Ada County who joined as Plaintiffs herein after the thirty (30) day statute of
limitations tolled to remain in this case as Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs agree that IRCP Rule 17(a) controls
this issue. Liberal construction should be given to this rule and courts should "further the policy
favoring the just resolution of actions - providing litigants their day in court." Hayward v. Valley

Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342,348, 33 P.3d 816,822 (2001), citingHolmes v. Henderson Oil Co.,
102 Idaho 214, 628 P.2d 1048 (1981).
As previously pointed out, the claims of these putative Plaintiffs are identical to those of the
initial Plaintiffs, and therefore do not add any additional claims or causes of action not contemplated
by the initial Plaintiffs in the initial complaint. The necessary jurisdictional standing to adjudicate
the issues raise in the Complaint has been met by the initial Plaintiffs. The Court points out in its
decision thatjoinder of a real party in interest under Rule 17(a) must occur within a reasonable time.
In the present case all of said additional Plaintiffs joined before the Defendant City responded.
Procedurally speaking that is about as early as is possible. Moreover, these Plaintiffs were not
"placeholders," since standing and jurisdiction had already been established by the initial Plaintiffs.

Conda Partnership, Inc., v. MD Const. Co. Inc., 115 Idaho 902, 904, 771 P.2d 920,922 (Ct. App.
1989).
As the Court found, these citizens acted in good faith and their joinder does not serve to
prejudice the Defendant City of Boise; therefore, as a matter of equity, the Court could exercise its
discretionary power under IRCP Rule 17(a) and allow these Plaintiffs their day in court. Equitable
relief was granted after a forfeiture arising from failure to act with the statute of limitations in

Bonner Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Standard Forest Products, Inc., 106 Idaho 682, 682 P.2d 635, (App.
1984). Because Bonner failed to foreclose against Standard within six months of the filing of its
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claim oflien, it lost its lien against the property in regard to Standard. Bonner's lien was held to be
extinguished. Nevertheless the Court remanded the case to determine whether Bonner might be
entitled to equitable relief from the loss of its lien rights against Standard's interest in the property.
The thirty (30) day limitation on any challenges to proceedings undertaken pursuant to the
Local Economic Development Act under LC. 50-2027(2) and LC. 502911(2) is extremely short by
any measure, especially given the economic magnitude, and far reaching physical effect on
communities attending urban renewal projects. The Court is urged to take judicial notice of this and
its effect on Citizens who desire "to have their day in court." In its Memorandum Decision and

Order, the Court concludes that its decision not to grant its discretion and allow joinder is
"consistent with the strict jurisdictional limitation provided for in Idaho Code § 50-2027 and the
legislature's purpose for finality of ordinances." However, since the joinder of these citizens would
have absolutely no effect on the finality of the subject ordinances in this case, the rationale for the
extremely strict jurisdictional limitation disappears as grounds to prevent the Court from exercising
its discretion and allow them to join.

III.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to exercise its discretion, reconsider, and alter the
Court's Decision and Order and Final Judgment by vacating the dismissal of said additional
Plaintiffs and allowing them to join this action pursuant to the Amended Complaint and the Second

Amended Complaint respectively.
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Respectively submitted this 26 th day of July, 2019.

By:

/S/ John Runft
JOHN L. RUNFT
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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COMES NOW the Defendant, City of Boise, by and through its attorney of record, Scott
B. Muir, and submits its Reply to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs bring their motion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e) and 60(b)(1), seeking
reconsideration of the Court’s Decision and Order and Final Judgment granting the City’s Motion
to Dismiss, striking the Second Amended Complaint, and dismissing Plaintiffs added after the
initial Complaint.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) is not the appropriate rule under which Plaintiffs
can seek reconsideration. There is "no mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."
Plaintiffs assert that the City gave written permission to file the Second Amended Complaint, but
to the contrary, the City declined to stipulate to the filing of the Second Amended Complaint.
(Runft. Decl., ¶ 4, p. 2, Ex. A.) Rather, it was contemplated that Plaintiffs would file a motion to
amend the complaint and the City would not oppose the motion. Plaintiffs never filed a motion.
But regardless, this discussion is moot, as the City never waived the defense of statute of
limitations. As the Court correctly held, the Amended Complaint and the Second Amended
Complaint were both filed after the 30 day statute of limitations set by Idaho Code § 50-2027(2)
had run. Therefore the additional Plaintiffs (Clint Siegner, Blue Valley Tenant Association,
Christine Brown, Rick Brown, Heather Campbell-Adams, Kathleen Greene, Gary Hardey, Bonita
Hardey, Charlene Landin, Juan Landin, and Joyce Magnuson), who were added in the Amended
Complaint and Second Amended Complaint, did not timely file claims. There is no basis for
joinder of new Plaintiffs after the running of the statute of limitations pursuant to I.R.C.P. 17(a)(3),
and Plaintiffs cite no authority supporting their position to the contrary. Plaintiffs' argument that
the "thirty (30) day limitation on any challenges to proceedings undertaken pursuant to Local
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Economic Devleopment Act under I.C. 50-2027(2) and I.C. 502911(2) [sic] is extremely short by
any measure.. . ." (Br. In Supp. Of Pls‘ Mot. To Amend and Alter J., p. 20) is not a legal argument
to be considered by the Court, but rather, an issue for the legislature.
Plaintiffs allege that the City has violated Article VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution, as
follows:
33. The commitment by the City to allocate the TIF to the CCDC for 20 years
pursuant to the Ordinances violates Article VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution and
creates by and through said commitment a liability on the part of the City to the
CCDC in violation of the express prohibition contained in Article VIII, § 3, to-wit:
"No county, city, board of education, or school district, or other subdivision of the
state, shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in any manner, or for any purpose,
exceeding in that year, the income and revenue provided for it for such year.. . ."
(Am. Compl., ¶ 33, pp. 7-8.)
Plaintiffs' allegation that the Shoreline District Urban Renewal Plan and the Gateway East
District Urban Renewal Plan create indebtedness or liability for the City is not only unsupported
by authority, the Idaho Supreme Court has clearly ruled to the contrary. It is the urban renewal
agency that uses revenue allocation financing. "[U]rban renewal agencies are not the 'alter egos'
of cities. Therefore, the Act’s grant of authority to urban renewal agencies to issue revenue
allocation bonds does not violate Article VIII, §§ 3 or 4 of the Idaho Constitution." Urban Renewal
Agency of City of Rexburg v. Hart, 148 Idaho 299, 303, 222 P.3d 467, 471 (2009). This holding
was first enunciated in Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 94 Idaho 876, 499 P.2d
575 (1972) and the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "Herein plaintiff [Boise Redevelopment Agency]
has no ability to actually encumber any of the resources of the City of Boise and cannot spend
beyond its own funds and property holdings." Id. at 94 Idaho 883. Given the Yick Kong Corp.
decision, the Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that the City does not create indebtedness or
liability by creating urban renewal districts.
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Plaintiffs have filed this motion frivolously and without a reasonable basis in fact or law.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the above arguments, Defendant City of Boise respectfully requests this
Court deny Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment.
DATED this

11th

day of September 2019.
OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY
/s/ Scott B. Muir
SCOTT B. MUIR, Deputy City Attorney
Attorney for Defendant
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REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND AND ALTER JUDGMENT - 4

000089

Electronically Filed
9/13/2019 10:56 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

JOHN L. RUNFT (ISB # 1059)
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Phone: (208) 333-8506
Fax: (208) 343-3246
Email: JRunft@runftsteele.com
Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

WAYNE HOFFMAN, an individual; FREDERIC
S. BIRNBAUM, an individual; BRUCE C.
BOYLES, an individual; G&G VENTURES, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company; ANDREA
LANNING, an individual; and BOB TIKKER, an
individual,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV0l-19-01127
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO AMEND AND
ALTER JUDGMENT

vs.
Rules 59(e) and 60(b )(1)
THE CITY OF BOISE, IDAHO; a municipal
corporation and a political sub-division of the State
ofldaho.
Defendant.

COME NOW the above named Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record, John L.
Runft of the firm of Runft & Steele Law Offices, PLLC, and respectfully submit this reply to
Defendant's response (hereinafter, "Reply") to Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment
pursuant to IRCP Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b)(l) for reconsideration of the Court's Decision and

Order and Final Judgment granting the City's Motion to Dismiss, striking the Second Amended
Complaint, and dismissing Plaintiffs added after the initial Complaint, and to issue an Order (i)
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denying the City's Motion to Dismiss; (ii) to reverse and vacate its order striking the Second

Amended Complaint; and (iii) to allowing the parties who were added as additional Plaintiffs in the
Amended and Second Amended Complaints to proceed as Plaintiffs in the action, filed with this
Court on July 26, 2019.

ARGUMENT

1.

The averred liability of the City to CCDC is created by City's passage of the
Ordinances creating the subject Urban Renewal Districts, which Ordinances adopts the
respective Plans and obligate the City to provide tax increment funding to CCDC; said
averred liability is not based on any claim of alter ego.

The City misconstrues Plaintiffs' case. Plaintiffs agree with the City's claim on page 3 of its
response (sic "Reply") that it is the urban renewal agency ("CCDC") that uses the revenue allocation
financing ("TIF") to fund the issuance of non-recourse revenue bonds and that urban renewal
agencies are not alter egos of cities. It is precisely because cities are not alter egos of urban renewal
agencies that the City created a separate and distinct liability when it obligated itself to allocate the
TIF to the CCDC for 20 years pursuant to the Ordinances in violation of Article VIII, §3 of the Idaho
Constitution. Plaintiffs agree with the City that the revenue bonds financed by the TIF payments to
CCDC have no recourse against the City, that under the Plan adopted by the Ordinances the City's
assets are not encumbered to provide security for the bonds, and that the CCDC cannot spend
beyond its own funds and property holdings. Plaintiffs' case does not concern or make any claim
regarding any liability of the urban renewal agency (CCDC). However, Plaintiffs aver that pursuant
to the provisions of the Local Economic Development Act (LC. 50-2901, et seq.), the City has
contractually obligated itself by passing the Ordinance and adopting the Plan to provide TIF, thereby
supplying a 20 year revenue stream to CCDC in violation of Article VIII §3 of the Idaho
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Constitution. As argued in Plaintiffs’ opening brief, this obligation clearly constitutes a liability
under the holdings of Feil v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643 (1912) and Koch v,
Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 162-163, 177 P. 3d 372 (2008).
The Court and the City misinterpret the Idaho Supreme Court’s holdings in Urban Renewal
Agency of City of Rexburg v. Hart, 222 P.3d 467, 148 Idaho 299 (Idaho 2009) and Boise
Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong, 94 Idaho 876, 499 P.2d 575, (1972). Whereas it is true that the
City does not create indebtedness or liability by the mere act of creating urban renewal districts,
Plaintiffs do claim that the City contracted indebtedness and the ensuing liability for 20 years to
CCDC by passing the Ordinances which approved and adopted the Plan containing the TIF
provisions. The only issue decided by Hart was that urban renewal agencies are not alter egos of
cities. The above issue of whether a City creates indebtedness and liability by providing TIF to an
urban renewal agency was raised in the Hart case, but expressly not ruled on or decided. See Hart,
148 Idaho 301, 222 P.3d 469. See also, Footnote 1: “Many of Hart's arguments are challenges to the
City's enactment of Ordinance No. 950. We are not free to reach the merits of his challenges to the
ordinance.”
The City apparently disagrees that these issues (“challenges”) not ruled on in Hart are the
same as those raised in the present case and therefore claim that “Plaintiffs have filed this motion
frivolously and without a reasonable basis in law or fact. The un-adjudicated “challenges” raised by
plaintiff Hart are precisely those raised by Plaintiffs in the present case. The Court is referred to
Exhibit A of the Declaration of John L. Runft in Support of Reply to Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion
to Amend and Alter Judgment, filed concurrently herewith, which Exhibit is a true and correct copy
of the Appellant’s Brief in Hart filed on December 8, 2008.
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The first of the three designated issues on appeal was as follows:
a.
The Revenue Allocation Scheme violates the provisions of the Idaho
Constitution prohibiting the city of Rexburg incurring indebtedness or lending its
credit without confirmation by a super majority of the city’s citizens;
Whereas, the constitutional challenges raised in Hart against revenue allocation financing
(“TIF”) under the Local Economic Development Act were both “facial” and “as applied,” the latter
challenge mirrors the challenge in the present case. At page 10 of Appellant Hart’s Brief, the
constitutional effect of the application of TIF on municipalities was stressed as the main issue of the
case:
Appellant’s focus in this appeal is on the constitutional effect which the application
of the provisions of the Local Economic Development Act in conjunction with the
Urban Renewal Law has on the municipalities with respect to their use and pledge of
ad valorem tax generated funds to raise money to finance the subject projects without
voter approval. Indeed, if the municipalities are constitutionally prohibited from
participating in “revenue allocation financing” then the scheme falls apart.
At pages 11-12, the creation of a debt and liability by a municipality is alleged:
After stressing that the framers of the Idaho Constitution intended the term “liability”
to be more expansive than the term “debt”, the Court in Feil included in the
definition of liability “the state of being bound or obligated in law or justice to do,
pay, or make good something; legal responsibility….” Id. Hence, the legal
responsibilities of the entities engaged in an urban renewal plan and project involving
revenue allocation financing results in said parties incurring respective liabilities.
Further, despite all applicable attempts to distinguish incremental revenues in this
instance, they are still proceeds from property taxes and therefore cannot be removed
from the category of obligations which must be approved by the voters under the
provisions of Article VIII, Section 3.

The Idaho Supreme Court abstained from addressing the above issue in Hart. The fact that
the Idaho Supreme Court held that the urban renewal agency (which is not subject to Article VIII §3)
can issue revenue allocation bonds is not dispositive of the issue of whether the City violated Article
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VIII §3 by obligating itself to provide TIF to CCDC. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that
the City’s Motion to Dismiss should be denied.
2.

In conjunction with Plaintiffs’ application under Rule 60(b)(1) the Court has authority
to exercise of its discretion under Rule 17(a) and reverse and vacate its order dismissing
the parties joined as Plaintiffs in the Amended and Second Amended Complaints.
Court points out in its Decision that adjudication of this issue of allowing these persons to

join in this case is discretionary and that Rule 17(a) controls the exercise of its discretion. The
fundamental rationale for allowing joinder is a primary axiom of law and justice manifested in the
“policy favoring the just resolution of actions--providing litigants their day in court.” Holmes v.
Henderson Oil Co., 102 Idaho 214, 628 P.2d 1048 (1981). Plaintiffs respectively submit that based
in this fundamental policy, the Court should exercise its discretion to allow these parties to join for
the reason that there exist no negative reasons or harmful effect created by their joinder. In its
Decision, the Court found:
(a)

That joinder under Rule 17(a), must occur within a reasonable time. In the

present case all of said additional Plaintiffs joined very early in the case; i.e. before
the Defendant City responded;
(b)

That these Plaintiffs were not “placeholders.

Indeed, standing and

jurisdiction had already been established by the initial Plaintiffs and the pleadings of
these parties seeking joinder are identical to those of the initial Plaintiffs, and
therefore do not add any additional claims, issues, or causes of action;
(c)

That the joinder of these parties does not serve to prejudice the City;

(d)

With standing and jurisdiction having already been established, the joinder of

these parties could have no effect on the policy of “finality of ordinances” and that
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policy's justification in rationale for the "strict jurisdictional limitation." The City
claims that these parties have "no basis for joinder." The above factors support the
discretionary granting of these parties' expressed desire to "have their day in court,"
which desire does not need explanation, and which is in itself justification for the
grant, when there are no substantive reasons for denying their application.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to reconsider and alter the Court's Decision and

Order and Final Judgment by denying the City's Motion to Dismiss, and exercise its discretion by
allowing the additional parties to join this action pursuant to the Amended Complaint and the Second

Amended Complaint, respectively.

Respectively submitted this 13 th day of September, 2019.

By: __/_S/_J_o_hn_R_un_fl_t_ _ _ _ _ __
JOHN L. RUNFT
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this 13 th day of September, 2019, I filed the foregoing electronically through the
iCourt system, which caused the following parties or counsel to be served by electronic means, as
more fully reflected on the Notice of Electronic Filing:

Jayme B. Sullivan
Boise City Attorney

boisecityattorney@ci tyofboise. org

Scott B. Muir
Deputy City Attorney
Kevin S. Borger
Deputy City Attorney
City of Boise
Office of the City Attorney
PO Box 500
Boise, Idaho 83701

RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

/S/ John Runft
JOHN L. RUNFT
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Korsen, Janine

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

Wayne Hoffman, Fred Birnbaum,
Andrea Lanning, Bob Tikker, Bruce
Boyles, G&G Ventures, LLC, Clint
Siegner, Blue Valley Tenant
Association, Christine Brown, Rick
Brown, Heather Campbell-adams,
Kathleen Greene, Gary Hardey,
Bonita Hardey, Charlene Landin,
Juan Landin, Joyce Magnuson
Plaintiff,
vs.
City of Boise, Idaho
Defendant.

Case No. CV01-19-01127
Memorandum Decision and Order
Denying Motion to Amend and Alter
Judgment
I.R.C.P. 59(e) and 60(b)

Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment, filed July 26, 2019, came before
the Court for oral argument on September 18, 2019.
Appearances:

John Runft for Plaintiffs
Scott Muir for Defendant
BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Wayne Hoffman, Fred Birnbaum, Bruce Boyles, G&G Ventures, LLC,
Andrea Lanning, and Bob Tikker filed a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
on January 17, 2019. The Complaint challenges two ordinances passed by Boise City
pursuant to I.C. §50-2906, referenced in this Court's previous decision as the Shoreline
Plan and the Gateway Plan.
On March 11, 2019, without filing a motion for leave to amend since the City of
Boise had not answered, an Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
was filed which added additional Plaintiffs.
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment
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On March 28, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory
and Injunctive Relief "in order to more clearly explicate the dates and monetary
information in the salient facts of the matter." 1
The Defendant City of Boise filed a Motion to Dismiss.

After briefing and a

hearing on the motion, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order Granting
the Motion to Dismiss and Striking Second Amended Complaint ("Order"). 2 The Court
then entered Final Judgment striking the Second Amended Complaint, Dismissing all
Claims in the Amended Complaint, and entering Judgment for Defendant. 3
Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment with supporting
memorandum and declaration, 4 arguing the City and the Urban Renewal Agency can
create an obligation which is a different issue than was actually decided in Urban
Renewal Agency of City of Rexburg v. Hart, 148 Idaho 299, 222 P .3d 467 (2009).
The Defendant City of Boise filed a response to the motion titled Reply to Motion
to Amend and Alter Judgment. 5 The City argues urban renewal plans do not incur a
commitment or a liability of the City since an urban renewal agency cannot encumber
funds of the city as was decided in Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Vick Kong Corp.,
94 Idaho 876, 499 P.2d 572 (1972).
The Court has considered all materials filed in support of and opposition to the
Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment.
LEGAL STANDARD

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides enumerated grounds for relief for a
party from a court order or judgment. IDAHO R. CIv. PRO. 60(b)(1 )-(6). Under Rule 60,
"the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons:"

Declaration of John Runft in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment, Rules 59(e) and
60(b)(1) ("Runft Declaration"), filed July 26, 2019
2
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and Striking Second Amended Complaint
("Order"), filed July 12, 2019.
3
Final Judgment, filed July 12, 2019.
4
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment, Rules 59(e) and 60(b)(1), filed July 26, 2019; Brief in
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment, Rules 59(e) and 60(b)(1) ("Plaintiffs' Brief"), filed July
26, 2019; Declaration of John Runft in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment, Rules 59(e) and
60(b)(1) ("Runft Declaration"), filed July 26, 2019.
5
Reply to Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment ("Response Brief"), filed September 11, 2019.
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(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b );
(3)
fraud
(whether
previously
called
intrinsic
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;

or

extrinsic),

(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based
on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 61 provides further instruction regarding errors during
case proceedings, stating:
Unless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding
evidence, or any other error by the court or a party, is ground for granting
a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order. At every stage of the
proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not
affect any party's substantial rights.
Rule 59( e) requires "[a] motion to alter or amend the judgment ... be filed and served no
later than 14 days after entry of the judgment."
ANALYSIS

1. Second Amended Complaint
Plaintiffs' move the Court pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) to reconsider its decision to
strike the Second Amended Complaint on the grounds of mistake or inadvertence. 6 The
Court has discretion to grant relief under subsection (b)(1) for mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect. Knight Ins., Inc., v. Knight, 109 Idaho 56, 58-59 (Ct.
App. 1985). Under Rule 15, a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of right
and "in all other cases ... may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written
consent or the court's leave." IDAHO R. CIv. PRO. 15(a)(1 )-(2).
Plaintiffs argue the Defendant stipulated in writing to their filing of the Second
Amended Complaint so the Court erroneously struck the pleading.

For support,

Plaintiffs cite to an email exchange between their counsel, John Ruft, and Defendant's

Plaintiffs' Brief, pp16-21.
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counsel, Scott Muir and Kevin Borger, arguing the email demonstrates in writing that the
Defendant stipulated to the filing of the Second Amended Complaint. 7
From the Court's reading, the email exchange does not show Defendant
"consenting" to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs' counsel sent an email
requesting the Defendant stipulate to the filing, stating:
I am seeking the City's consent via stipulation ... to amend paragraphs 27
and 28 of Amended Complaint. ...
Please let me know whether the City will consent to the proposed
amendment per Rule 15(a)(2) or whether I will need to seek the Court's
leave to do so. If you are able to consent, I will prepare the appropriate
stipulation of the parties consenting to said filing.
Plaintiffs did not include a copy of any responsive email.

However, it is clear from

Plaintiffs' following email to Defendant that the Defendant would not stipulate to
Plaintiffs' filing of the Second Amended Complaint, instead indicating Defendant would
not file an opposition to Plaintiffs' request and would not require formal service of the
Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs' counsel clearly states in that email that it was
the Plaintiffs' understanding that "the city declines to stipulate to [Plaintiffs] filing the
Second Amended Complaint."
The Court finds that, although Defendant would not oppose the filing, the
Defendant did not stipulate to the filing of the Second Amended Complaint. This is an
important distinction.

The decision to not file an opposition is not the equivalent of

consent or a stipulation to another parties' action.
Further, based on the communications before the Court, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs did not attach the Second Amended Complaint for the Defendant's review
before they filed the document. Plaintiffs' only sent the Second Amended Complaint
after it was filed with the Court. 8 Plaintiffs' email requesting consent only addressed
changes to paragraphs 27 and 28 of the Amended Complaint, whereas the Second
Amended Complaint that was filed sought to add parties and included changes that
were not outlined in the prior email. Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiffs did not request
consent for all

material

changes

to

the

Amended

Complaint

in

the

email

See generally Runft Declaration
Muir Affidavit, Exhibit B.
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communications. The Court will not infer Defendant's consent to changes which the
Defendant could not have been aware of when consent was sought.
Since the Defendant did not consent or stipulate to the filing of the Second
Amended Complaint, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs had to move for leave from the
Court before they could have properly filed the Second Amended Complaint.

Since

Plaintiffs did not, the Second Amended Complaint was not a properly filed pleading and
was properly stricken by this Court. Thus, relief from the Judgment striking the Second
Amended Complaint is not appropriate and the Court will not reconsider this decision.
2. Dismissal of Plaintiffs Added in First and Second Amended Complaints
After Thirty Day Statute of Limitations Had Run
Plaintiffs argue the additional Plaintiffs acted in good faith, "join[ing] before the

Defendant City responded ... [which] is about as early as possible" and their joinder does
not prejudice the City of Boise. 9

Plaintiff argues this Court should "exercise its

discretionary power under IRCP Rule (sic) 17(a) to allow these Plaintiffs their day in
court." 10 Regardless of the prejudice to the Defendant, the Court finds it does not have
discretion under Rule 17(a) to allow additional Plaintiffs to raise a claim when no
mistake has been alleged and there is a statutory bar. 11
Further, Plaintiffs' argument that the "thirty (30) day limitation on any challenges
to proceedings undertaken pursuant to the Local Economic Development Act. .. is
extremely short" 12 is unavailing. The proceedings that the Local Economic Development
Act govern are well-publicized and involve a lengthy decision-making process, which in
themselves allow an opportunity to prepare for any objections prior to the thirty day
deadline beginning to run. Whether the thirty day length is too short is an issue for the
legislature, not for this Court. Because the thirty day statute of limitation is set by the
legislature, the Court finds it does not have the authority to depart from this statutory
limitation. Therefore, the Court declines to alter or amend the Judgment on this basis.

9

10
11
12

Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 19-20.
Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 19.
See Order pp. 8-9.
Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 20.
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3. Standing
a. There Was No Commitment, Liability or Indebtedness of the City

The Plaintiffs allege in the Amended Complaint that it was the City of Boise's
promulgation of the ordinances and use of tax increment financing ("TIF") to raise funds
for the urban renewal agencies that was the constitutionally infirmed "commitment." 13
Plaintiffs again argue the City assumed an unconstitutional

liability by

"committing" in the Ordinances to provide tax increment financing to the CCDC to
finance the projects (including bonds ). 14 Article VII I, §3, of the Idaho Constitution
actually uses the terms "liability" and "indebtedness" 15 and not the term "commitment"
as used in the pleading by the Plaintiffs.

13

Relevant Allegations in Amended Complaint related to standing include:
22. Ord. 55-18 adopted and provided for "revenue allocation financing" also known as
"tax increment financing" ("TIF") of the Shoreline Plan pursuant to I.C. §50-2906.
24. On December 18, 2018, the City passed Ordinance No. 58-18 ("Ord 58-81")(sic)
approving the Gateway East District Urban Renewal Plan ("GatewayPlan") that was
developed by and presented to the City for approval by the CCDC.
27. In promulgating Ordinance 55-18, the City committed to providing TIF financing to the
CCDC's estimated "Project Costs" in the sum of $66,500,000.00 for the 20 year duration
of the Shoreline Plan, commencing retroactively from January 1, 2018, through
December 31, 2038. Said financing substantially exceed the City's annual income and
revenue.
28. In promulgating Ordinance 55-18, the City committed to providing TIF financing to the
CCDC's estimated "Project Costs" in the sum of $96,500,000.00 for the 20 year duration
of the Gateway Plan, commencing retroactively from January 1, 2018, through December
31, 2038. Said financing substantially exceed the City's annual income and revenue.

33. The commitment by the City to allocate the TIF to the CCDC for 20 years pursuant to
the Ordinances violates Article VIII, §3 of the Idaho Constitution and creates by and
through said commitment liability on the part of the City to the CCDC in violation of the
express prohibition contained in Article VIII, §3 ....
(emphasis added).
14
Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 5.
15
See O'Bryant v. City of Idaho Falls, 78 Idaho 313, 325-326, 303 P.2d 672, 678-679
(1956) which cites Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643, 43 L.R.A.,N.S., 1095
and discusses,
... the word "liability," which is used in our Constitution, and which is a much more
sweeping and comprehensive term than the word "indebtedness"; nor are the words "in
any manner or for any purpose" given any special attention by the courts in the foregoing
cases. The framers of our Constitution were not content to say [in Article VI 11, §3] that no
city shall incur any indebtedness "in any manner or for any purpose," but they rather
preferred to say that no city shall incur any indebtedness or liability in any manner, or for
any purpose. It must be clear to the ordinary mind, on reading this language, that the
framers of the Constitution meant to cover all kinds and character of debts and
obligations for which a city may become bound, and to preclude circuitous and evasive
methods of incurring debts and obligations to be met by the city or its inhabitants."
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The City argues "[i]t is the urban renewal agency that uses revenue allocation
financing" and the "City does not create any indebtedness or liability by creating urban
renewal districts." 16
When asked at hearing how Plaintiffs believed the city had incurred an
indebtedness or liability of City funds, Plaintiffs argued that the City and the urban
renewal agency could create an obligation of the City by contract. But there is no such
contract actually alleged in the Amended Complaint. The only basis of action by the
City alleged is promulgating the ordinance. Further, in Paragraph 32 of the Amended
Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege, "As required by Idaho Code §50-2908, the TIF revenues
allocated to the CCDC pursuant to the Ordinances are calculated and paid directly to
the CCDC by the County Treasurer of Ada County, Idaho."

So, the Plaintiffs

acknowledge in the Amended Complaint that the TIF revenues are paid directly from the
County to CCDC and are never paid to the City and then diverted to CCDC.
Therefore, the Court will not reconsider its decision as to Urban Renewal
prohibiting a constitutional challenge on the City's indebtedness or commitment of
funds. The Court has not changed its position on Koch et al. v. Canyon County, 145
Idaho 158, 162-163, 177 P.3d 372 (2008), as is set out in its original Order. In Urban
Renewal Agency of City of Rexburg v. Hart, the Idaho Supreme Court held

"authorization of agency's use of revenue allocation financing did not violate sections of
constitution that placed restrictions on cities' ability to incur indebtedness." 148 Idaho
299, 222 P.3d 467 (2009).
Therefore, the Court will not reconsider the dismissal on this basis.
b. If There Was No Commitment, Liability or Indebtedness of City Funds,
Then Whether Approval by Two-Thirds of Voters Does Not Bar Dismissal
Still, in Urban Renewal, when addressing claims raised against the city, the Court
determined the only direct action the city had taken was passing the ordinance and that
any claims against the city for passing the ordinance were precluded by the statute of
limitations. Id. 148 Idaho at 301, FN 1, 222 P.3d at 469. As a basis for requesting this
Court alter or amend its Judgment, the Plaintiffs point to footnote 1 in Urban Renewal
that says,

16

Response Brief, p. 3.
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Many of Hart's arguments are challenges to the City's enactment of
Ordinance No. 950. We are not free to reach the merits of his challenges
to the ordinance .... [because] Hart did not challenge the City's adoption of
the ordinance until March 28, 2008, more than two years after the 30 day
deadline prescribed by I.C. § 50-2911 had expired.
Id. The Plaintiffs argue that challenges to whether a vote of two-thirds for the Ordinance
was required is now properly raised before the district court in this case so litigation of
challenges to the enactment of the Ordinance are not precluded by the Urban Renewal
decision.
Page 9 of the Plaintiffs brief argues, "In reviewing the allegations in these three
paragraphs [22, 24 and 33] of the Amended Complaint, it is clear that Plaintiffs claim
that the alleged violation arises from the unconstitutional manner in which the City went
about committing to allocate the TIF to the CCDC pursuant to its ordinances by failing to
get voter approval." Paragraphs 22, 24 and 33 do not mention a requirement for twothirds of voter approval.

The sections of the Amended Complaint addressing voter

approval are Paragraphs 29 through 31 .17
Article VIII, section 3 states:
No county, city, board of education, or school district, or other subdivision
of the state, shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in any manner, or for
any purpose, exceeding in that year, the income and revenue provided for
it for such year, without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors
thereof voting at an election to be held for that purpose....
Any
indebtedness or liability incurred contrary to this provision shall be void:
provided that this section shall not be construed to apply to the ordinary
and necessary expenses authorized by the general laws of the state ....
17

These paragraphs of the Amended Complaint read as follows:
29. Both Ord. 55-18 and Ord. 58-18 (the "Ordinances") were passed without the assent of
two-thirds (2/3) of the qualified electors thereof voting at an election to be held for that
purpose as required under Article VII I §3 of the Idaho Constitution for cities and other
subdivisions of the State whenever they incur any indebtedness or liability, other than for
ordinary and necessary expenses, in excess of their income and revenue for the year.
30. In promulgating the Ordinances, the City failed to find or to establish that the subject
revenue allocation financing (TIF financing) for the Shoreline Plan or the Gateway Plan
would be used to fund "ordinary and necessary" expenses of the City as provided and
required under Article VIII §3 of the Idaho Constitution.
31. None of the exceptions set forth in Article VI 11 §3 of the Idaho Constitution to the
requirement that the assent of two-thirds (2/3) of the qualified electors be obtained in the
event there is no finding that the revenue allocation funding would be used to fund
"ordinary and necessary" expenses of the City are applicable with respect to the
promulgation of the Ordinances.
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Further, "[t]axpayers have been held qualified to maintain an action to test the validity of
a statute or ordinance which increases the tax burden, [including those] involve[ing] an
alleged illegal expenditure of public money." Greer v. Lewiston Golf & Country Club,
Inc., 81 Idaho 393, 397, 342 P.2.d 719, 722 (1959).

Since the Court determined in Standing Section a. above, that as a matter of law
there was no commitment, indebtedness or liability of City funds, then the issue of
whether assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors was required to enact the
Ordinances does not preclude dismissal. 18
Therefore, the Court will not reconsider its dismissal and will not alter or amend
the Judgment to reinstate this action.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment, filed
July 26, 2019, is DENIED in its entirety.
Since the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion, the Court will rule in a separate
decision on the objection to attorney fees.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: 10/18/2019 03:56 PM

Lyn~
Judge

18

While Plaintiffs identified in Paragraphs 29 through 31 of the Amended Complaint that there may
be a factual issue of whether the TIF financing of the ordinances would be used to fund ordinary and
necessary expenses of the City, since there was no commitment, indebtedness or liability by the City in the TIF
financing as a matter of law the factual issue is moot.

Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment
Page 9 of 10

000105

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this day I served a copy of the attached to:
John L. Runft
Scott B. Muir

[X] E-mail
[X] E-mail

jrunft@runftsteele.com
boca@cityofboise.org

Phil McGrane
Clerk of the Court
Dated: 10/18/2019

By(fl(~/1,nw,
puty Clerk

Signed: 10/18/2019 03:58 PM
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Filed: 10/18/2019 16:00:07
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Korsen, Janine
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Wayne Hoffman, Fred Birnbaum,
Andrea Lanning, Bob Tikker, Bruce
Boyles, G&G Ventures, LLC, Clint
Siegner, Blue Valley Tenant
Association, Christine Brown, Rick
Brown, Heather Campbell-adams,
Kathleen Greene, Gary Hardey,
Bonita Hardey, Charlene Landin,
Juan Landin, Joyce Magnuson
Plaintiff,
vs.
City of Boise, Idaho
Defendant.

Case No. CV01-19-01127
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING ATTORNEY FEES

On April 12, 2019, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss with supporting
memorandum. 1 The Court granted the motion and entered Judgment for City of Boise
and dismissing the Amended Complaint. 2
Defendant then filed a timely Memorandum for Attorney Fees and Costs with
supporting declaration, 3 requesting $4,518.00 in attorney fees. 4

Plaintiffs filed a

"Response and Opposition to Attorney Fees." 5 On August 27, 2019, Defendant noticed
the issue of attorney fees for hearing and on September 11, 2019, filed a reply. 6
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to IRCP 12(b )(1) & (6), filed Apr. 12, 2019; Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(1) & (6), filed Apr. 12, 2019.
2
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and Striking Second Amended
Complaint, filed July 12, 2019; Final Judgment, filed July 12, 2019.
3
Defendant City of Boise's Memorandum of Attorney Fees ("Def's Memo"), filed July 26, 2019;
Declaration of Scott B. Muir in Support of Memorandum of Attorney Fees ("Muir Dec"), filed July 26, 2019.
4
Def's Memo, p. 2; Muir Dec, ,I 4.
5
Plaintiff's' response in Opposition to Attorney Fees ("Pis' Response"), filed Aug. 9, 2019.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ("I.R.C.P.") 54 sets forth the specific process for objecting to a
memorandum of costs:
Any party may object to the claimed costs of another party set forth in a memorandum of
costs by filing and serving on adverse parties a motion to disallow part or all of such costs
within fourteen (14) days of service of the memorandum of cost. ... Failure to timely
object to the items in the memorandum of costs shall constitute a waiver of all objections
to the costs claimed.

@

IDAHO R. CIv. PRO. 54(d)(5) (emphasis added). Rule 54 also address objections to attorney fees, stating
"[a]ny objection to a claim for attorney fees must be made in the same manner as an objection to costs as
provided by Rule 54(d)(5)." IDAHO R. CIV. PRO. 54(e)(6).
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The Court heard oral argument on the issue of attorney fees on September 18,
2019.
LEGAL STANDARD

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d) governs the award of costs 7 and 54( e)
governs the award of attorney fees. The relevant portion of Rule 54( e) reads:
(1) Pursuant to Contract or Statute. In any civil action the court may award
reasonable attorney fees, including paralegal fees, to the prevailing party
or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(1 )(8), when provided for by any statute
or contract.

(5) Attorney Fees as Costs. Attorney fees, when allowable by statute or
contract, are costs in an action and processed in the same manner as
other costs and included in the memorandum of costs. A claim for attorney
fees as costs must be supported by an affidavit of the attorney stating the
basis and method of computation.

These rules indicate an objection to proposed costs and attorneys' fees will come in the form of a
motion to disallow, which will then invoke the briefing schedules/timelines outlined in I.R.C.P. 6 and 7(b)
when set for hearing. In this case, Defendant filed a memorandum and affidavit of costs and attorneys'
fees on July 26, 2019. Plaintiffs timely filed a response in opposition on August 9, 2019 rather than a
motion to disallow the costs and fees. The Defendant set a hearing on the attorney fess issue on August
27, 2019 and filed a response (labeled "reply") seven days before the set hearing date. Therefore, the
timelines in I.R.C.P. 7 for responding and replying were ultimately invoked and the parties had the
opportunity to respond and be heard.
Therefore, the Court in its discretion determines that any procedural errors were harmless under
I.R.C.P. 61, so the Court considers the merits of the claims and arguments raised by the parties. To the
extent that the parties have briefed the fees issues, and have addressed them at oral argument, the Court
will rule on the Defendant's requested fees.
6
Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Attorney Fees ("Def's Reply"), filed Sep. 11, 2019.
7
The relevant portion of the rules read:
(d) Costs

(A) Parties Entitled to Costs. Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs are allowed as
a matter of right to the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
(4) Memorandum of Costs. At any time after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the
court, but not later than 14 days after entry of judgment, any party who claims costs may
file and serve on adverse parties a memorandum of costs, itemizing each claimed
expense. The memorandum must state that to the best of the party's knowledge and
belief the items are correct and that the costs claimed are in compliance with this rule.
Failure to timely file a memorandum of costs is a waiver of the right to costs. A
memorandum of costs prematurely filed is considered as timely.
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Subsection (3) of the Rule 54(e) sets for the factors the Court must consider in
awarding fees, including the time and labor required; the novelty and difficulty of the
questions; the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience
and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law; the prevailing charges for like
work; whether the fee is fixed or contingent; the time limitations imposed by the client or
the circumstances of the case; the amount involved and the results obtained; the
undesirability of the case; the nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client; awards in similar cases; the reasonable cost of automated legal research, if the
court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case; and any other factor
which the court deems appropriate in the particular case.
The determination of who is the prevailing party is in the discretion of the District
Court. In deciding who is the prevailing party, the Court considers, "(a) the final
judgment or result obtained in the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective
parties; (b) whether there were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (c)
the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on each of the issues or claims."
Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406, 411, 659 P.2d 160, 165 (Ct. App. 1983). Further,

"the prevailing party question is examined and determined from an overall view, not a
claim-by-claim analysis." Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 538, 224 P.3d 1125,
1127 (2010).
With regard to fees, as a general rule, "The determination to award or not award
attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court." Foster v. Shore Club
Lodge, Inc., 127 Idaho 921, 927, 908 P.2d 1228, 1234 (1995). When considering an

award of attorney fees, the Court must look at the factors outlined in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3).
"Rule 54(e)(3) does not require the district court to make specific findings in the record,
only to consider the stated factors in determining the amount of the fees. When
considering the factors, courts need not demonstrate how they employed any of those
factors in reaching an award amount." Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 750, 185
P.3d 258, 262 (2008).

"The bottom line in an award of attorney fees is

reasonableness." Id. Reasonableness and other attorney fee determinations, "are a
discretionary matter for the trial court and are reviewed under an abuse of discretion
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standard." Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761,
769, 86 P.3d 475, 483 (2004).
ANALYSIS

Defendant's memorandum requests $4,518.00 in attorney fees.
A. Prevailing Party

Regardless of the type of award requested-attorney fee or costs-the primary
analysis requires the Court to determine the prevailing party. The determination of who
is the prevailing party is in the discretion of the District Court. In making a prevailing
party determination, the Court considers, "(a) the final judgment or result obtained in the
action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties; (b) whether there were
multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (c) the extent to which each of the
parties prevailed on each of the issues or claims." Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406,
411, 659 P .2d 160, 165 (Ct. App. 1983).

Further, "the prevailing party question is

examined and determined from an overall view, not a claim-by-claim analysis."
Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 148 Idaho 536, 538, 224 P.3d 1125, 1127 (2010).
Because Plaintiffs admit Defendant is the prevailing party8 and the Court granted
Defendant's motion to dismiss, the Court finds the Defendant is the prevailing party.
B. Costs

Defendant did not include any request for costs. The time to request costs has
passed. See IDAHO R. CIv. PRO. 54(d)(4), (e)(5) Therefore the Court will not award
costs in this case.
C. Attorney Fees

Plaintiffs argue Defendant did not cite any statute or contract as a basis for their
fee request in its Memorandum of Fees or supporting declaration and therefore, the
Court should deny the request for failure to comply with the requirement under Rule
54(e)(1 ). 9 Although Defendant did not include any statutory cites in its filings related
only to the attorney fees request, Defendant put Plaintiffs on notice of its basis for
seeking fees as part of its motion to dismiss, stating:

8
9

Pis' Response, p. 2.
Pis' Response, p. 3.
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This action was brought in disregard to established Idaho law on point
from Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002)
(holding that Idaho Code § 50-2027 did not eliminate the requirement that
plaintiffs satisfy traditional standing requirements). Defendant City of Boise
is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees as the prevailing party
in an action brought Without a reasonable basis in fact or law pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 12-117. In the alternative, Defendant City of Boise is entitled
to an award of reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12121 as this action was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or
without foundation. 10
Therefore, the Court finds Defendant properly asserted the basis for the requested fees
in a filing received by the Plaintiffs prior to the deadline for filing a memorandum of fees.

See IDAHO R. CIv. PRO 54(e)(5). Any failure to include the statutory citations again as
part of the memorandum of attorney's fees is harmless error since Plaintiffs were on
notice of the basis for the fees request. See IDAHO R. CIv. PRO. 61.
Petitioner claims an award of attorney's fees, in the amount of $4,518 pursuant to
(1) Idaho Code§ 12-117; and/or (2) Idaho Code§ 12-121.
Idaho Code 12-117 states:
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any proceeding involving as
adverse parties a state agency or a political subdivision and a person, the
state agency, political subdivision or the court hearing the proceeding,
including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's
fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
IDAHO CODE§ 12-117(1 ).
Idaho Code § 12-121 provides in part, "In any civil action, the judge may award
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties .... " Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54( e )(2) then states, "Attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121 may
be awarded by the court only when it finds that the case was brought, pursued or
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation, which finding must be in
writing and include the basis and reasons for the award .... "
Defendant alleges this action was brought in disregard to established Idaho law
on point from Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002) (holding
that Idaho Code § 50-2027 did not eliminate the requirement that plaintiffs satisfy
10

@

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to IRCP 12(b)(1) & (6), p. 5.
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traditional standing requirements). Plaintiffs argued this case should be distinguished
from Thomson v. City of Lewiston, a 2002 case, because Koch et al. v, Canyon County,
145 Idaho 158, 162-163, 177 P. 3d 372 (2008) had changed the law and because the
Plaintiffs had pied this matter not just as a statutory violation, but also as a constitutional
violation. While the Plaintiffs were ultimately unsuccessful with those arguments, the
arguments were colorable enough as an argument to change or extend law that the
matter was not pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.
Therefore, the Court will not award attorney fees be paid by Plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendant's request for fees, filed July 26, 2019, is
DENIED.
ORDERED

Signed: 10/18/2019 03:57 PM

District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this day I served a copy of the attached to:
John L. Runft
Scott B. Muir

[X] E-mail
[X] E-mail

jrunft@runftsteele.com
boca@cityofboise.org

Phil McGrane
Clerk of the Court
Dated: 10/18

/2019

sala;:}:;f1P14L+1

Signed: 10/18/2019 04:00 PM
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Electronically Filed
11/26/2019 10:27 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Laurie Johnson, Deputy Clerk

JOHN L. RUNFT (ISB # 1059)
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
1020 W. Main Street, Suite 400
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Phone: (208) 333-8506
Fax: (208) 343-3246
Email: JRunft@runftsteele.com

Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

WAYNE HOFFMAN, an individual; FREDERIC
S. BIRNBAUM, an individual; BRUCE C.
BOYLES, an individual; G&G VENTURES, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company; ANDREA
LANNING, an individual; and BOB TIKKER, an
individual,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV0I-19-01127
PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF
APPEAL

vs.
THE CITY OF BOISE, IDAHO; a municipal
corporation and a political sub-division of the State
of Idaho.
Defendant.

TO:

Defendants City of Boise, Idaho, its attorneys of record, and to the Clerk of the above
referenced Court:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above named Plaintiffs, Wayne Hoffman, Frederic S. Birnbaum, Bruce C. Boyles, G&G
Ventures, LLC, Andrea Lanning, and Bob Tikker, hereby appeal against the named
Defendant, the City of Boise, Idaho (the "City") to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Final

Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal; Page 1 of 6
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Judgment entered in the above entitled action on the 12th day of July, 2019; and the
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment, entered in
the above entitled action on the 18th day of October, 2019, the Honorable Judge Lynn G.
Norton presiding. That portion of said Final Judgment entered pursuant to the Decision and
Order Striking Second Amended Complaint entered on July 12, 2019 that deals with and
adjudicates the striking of the Second Amended Complaint is not appealed herewith.
2. Appellants have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court above referenced Final
Judgment and Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion to Amend and Alter
Judgment pursuant to I.A.R. §11(a) and on the ground that the Judgment is a final judgment
appealable pursuant to I.R.C.P. §54(a).
3. Pursuant to I.A.R. §11(a), copies of the above referenced Final Judgment and Memorandum
Decision and Order Denying Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment are attached hereto.
4. The preliminary statement of the issues on appeal as currently identified and which the
Appellants intend to assert are:
a. Whether by promulgating ordinances adopting the subject Projects of the
urban renewal agency (“CCDC”) and allocating and committing TIF revenues
to the CCDC to fund said Projects for a period of 20 years in excess of the
City’s annual revenue without the approval of two-thirds (2/3) of the
qualified electors, did the City create a continuing obligation to the CCDC in
violation of Article VIII §3 of the Idaho Constitution?

Plaintiffs’ Notice of Appeal; Page 2 of 6
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b. Whether by obligating itself to the CCDC to so fund said Projects pursuant to
said ordinances, did the City incur a "liability" in violation of Article VIII §3
of the Idaho Constitution under Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32,
129 P. 643, 129 P. 643 (1912)?
c. Whether the District Court erred in dismissing this case for lack of standing
under Koch et al v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 299,222 P.3d 467 (2009) by
holding that the City did not violate Article VIII §3 of the Idaho Constitution
by promulgating said ordinances allocating and committing TIF revenues to
the CCDC in excess of the City's annual revenue without the approval of
two-thirds (2/3) of the qualified electors?
5. Transcript:
a. Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes.
b. Appellants request the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's
transcript via: [ ] hard copy, [ X] electronic copy, [ ] both:
1.

11.

Motion hearing held on: May 22, 2019.
Motion hearing held on: September 18, 2019.

6. Clerk's Record on Appeal: Appellants request the following documents to be included in the
Clerk's Record in addition to those automatically included pursuant to Rule 28 of the Idaho
Appellate Rules:
a. City's Motion to Dismiss, (04-12-2019);
b. City's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, (04-12-2019);
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c. Plaintiffs (misnamed "Defendants") Response to City's Motion to Dismiss,
(05-10-19);
d. City's Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, (05-20-19);
e. Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment, (07-29-19);
f.

Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment,
(07-26-19);

g. City's Response (misnamed "Reply") to Motion to Amend and Alter
Judgment, (09-11-19)
h. Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion to Amend and Alter Judgment,
(09-13-19).
7. Appellants request the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or admitted as
exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court:

a. None.

8. I certify that:

a. A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a
transcript has been requested as named below at the address said below:
Reporter:
Address:

Susan Sims
c/o Honorable Lynn G. Norton
Ada County Courthouse
Chambers Room 5149
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83 702
208 287-7564
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b. Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellants has contacted Ms. Sims to obtain the
estimated fee. Multiple messages have been left but no return call has been
received. Once the estimate is obtained counsel will pay the estimated fee;
c. The estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's Record will be paid;
d. The appellate filing fee has been paid; and
e. Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
I.A.R. 20.

th

DATED this 26 day of November, 2019.

By: __/_S/_J_o_h_n_R_u_n_ft_ _ _ _ _ _ __
JOHN L. RUNFT
Attorney for Plaintiffs / Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
th

I certify that on this 26 day of November, 2019, I filed the foregoing electronically through the
iCourt system, which caused the following parties or counsel to be served by electronic means, as
more fully reflected on the Notice of Electronic Filing:
Jayme B. Sullivan
Boise City Attorney

Via iCourt and Email:
boisecityattorney@cityofboise.org

Scott B. Muir
Deputy City Attorney
Kevin S. Borger
Deputy City Attorney
City of Boise
Office of the City Attorney
PO Box 500
Boise, Idaho 83701

Reporter: Susan Sims
c/o Honorable Lynn G. Norton
Ada County Courthouse
Chambers Room 5149
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83702

Via US Mail and Email:
dckorsjp@adacounty.id. gov

RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

/S/ John Runft
JOHN L. RUNFT
Attorney for Plaintiffs / Appellants
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

WAYNE HOFFMAN, an individual;
FREDERIC S. BIRNBAUM, an
individual; BRUCE C. BOYLES, an
individual; G&G VENTURES, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company;
ANDREA LANNING, an individual;
and BOB TIKKER, an individual,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Filed: 12/10/2019 15:41:24
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Wegener, Kelle

Order Conditionally
Dismissing Appeal

and
Docket No. 47590-2019
CLINT SIEGNER, BLUE VALLEY
TENANT ASSOCIATION, CHRISTINE
BROWN, RICK BROWN, HEATHER
CAMPBELL-ADAMS, KATHLEEN
GREENE, GARY HARDEY, BONITA
HARDEY, CHARLENE LANDIN,
JUAN LANDIN, and JOYCE
MAGNUSON,

Ada County District Court No.
CV01-19-01127

Plaintiffs,
V.

CITY OF BOISE, IDAHO, a municipal
corporation and a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho,
Defendant-Res ondent.

A Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on November 26, 2019, from the Final
Judgment filed on July 12, 2019, and the Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion to
Amend and Alter Judgment filed on October 18, 2019, both of which were entered by District
Judge Lynn G. Norton.

It appears the filing fee was paid; however, the required fees for

preparation of the Clerk's Record, pursuant to I.A.R. 27(c), and preparation of the Reporter's
Transcripts requested, pursuant to I.AR. 24(c), have not been paid to the District Court Clerk or
the designated Court Reporter; therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this appeal be, and hereby is, conditionally dismissed
and proceedings are suspended for twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order for
Appellants to pay the required fees for preparation of the Clerk's Record and Reporter's
Transcripts requested to the District Court Clerk and the designated Court Reporter.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event Appellants do not timely pay the required
fees to the District Court Clerk and the designated Court Reporter, proceedings in this appeal
may be dismissed without further notice.
_ _ _ day of December, 2019.
DATED this _ _11th
For the Supreme Court
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

WAYNE HOFFMAN, an individual;
FREDERIC S. BIRNBAUM, an
individual; BRUCE C. BOYLES, an
individual; G&G VENTURES, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company;
ANDREA LANNING, an individual;
and BOB TIKKER, an individual,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Filed: 12/11/2019 12:14:32
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Wegener, Kelle

Order Reinstating Appeal

and

Supreme Court Docket No. 47590-2019

CLINT SIEGNER, BLUE VALLEY
TENANT ASSOCIATION, CHRISTINE
BROWN, RICK BROWN, HEATHER
CAMPBELL-ADAMS, KATHLEEN
GREENE, GARY HARDEY, BONITA
HARDEY, CHARLENE LANDIN,
JUAN LANDIN, and JOYCE
MAGNUSON,

Ada County District Court No.
CV01-19-01127

Plaintiffs,
V.

CITY OF BOISE, IDAHO, a municipal
corporation and a political subdivision
of the State of Idaho,
Defendant-Respondent.

An Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal was issued on December 10, 2019, as the
required fees for preparation of the Clerk's Record, pursuant to I.A.R. 27(c), and preparation of
the Reporter's Transcripts, pursuant to I.A.R. 24(c), had not been paid to the District Court Clerk
or, the designated Court Reporter. Thereafter, the District Court and Court Reporter confirmed

the estimated fees were paid for preparation of the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcripts;
therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal issued by this
Court on October 10, 2019, is withdrawn and proceedings in this appeal are reinstated.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court Reporter shall prepare the transcripts
requested and submit a Notice of Lodging to the District Court Clerk on or before Friday,
January 10, 2020. The Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcripts shall be filed with this Court
by February 14, 2020.
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DATED this ___________ day of December, 2019.

11th
DATED this ___________
day of December, 2019.
For the Supreme Court
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Supreme Court No.

47590-2019

WAYNE HOFFMAN, an individual; FREDERIC
S. BIRNBAUM, an individual; BRUCE C.
BOYLES, an individual; G&G VENTURES,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company; ANDREA LANNING, an individual;)
and BOB TIKKER, an individual,
)

Filed: 02/05/2020 13:14:07
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Wegener, Kelle

)

Plaintiffs,

)
)

v.

)
)

THE CITY OF BOISE, IDAHO; a municipal
corporation and a political
sub-division of the State of Idaho,

)
)
)
)

Defendant.

)

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED

Notice is hereby given that on February 5,
I lodged a transcript,

2020,

44 pages in length, for the

above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of
Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District.

(Signature of Reporter)
Susan Sims, CSR-RPR
February 5, 2020

Dates:

May 22, 2019
September 18,

2019
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
WAYNE HOFFMAN, an individual;
FREDERIC S. BIRNBAUM, an
individual; BRUCE C. BOYLES, an
individual; G&G VENTURES, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company; ANDREA
LANNING, an individual, and BOB
TIKKER, an individual,

Supreme Court Case No. 47590
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
CLINT SIEGNER, BLUE VALLEY
TENANT ASSOCIATION, CHRISTINE
BROWN, RICK BROWN, HEATHER
CAMPBELL-ADAMS, KATHLEEN
GREENE, GARY HARDY, BONITA
HARDEY, CHARLENE LANDIN, JUAN
LANDIN, and JOYCE MAGNUSON,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
CITY OF BOISE, IDAHO, a municipal
corporation and a political subdivision of
the State of Idaho,
Defendant-Respondent.
I, PHIL McGRANE, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
WAYNE HOFFMAN, an individual; FREDERIC
S. BIRNBAUM, an individual; BRUCE C.
BOYLES, an individual; G&G VENTURES, LLC,
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